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Abstract 
This paper offers an academic examination of the legal regimes surrounding the criminalisation 
of irregular migrants in the EU and of acts of solidarity with irregular migrants, such as assisting 
irregular migrants to enter or remain in the EU, and other behaviour that is motivated by 
humanitarian instincts.  
The research analyses EU law and its relationship with national provisions regarding the 
criminalisation of irregular migration and of acts of solidarity vis-á-vis irregular migrants. A 
comparative analysis was made of the laws of the UK, France and Italy, supplemented by an 
analysis of the laws of Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. By considering the role of public 
trust in fostering compliance with the law, the paper explores the impact of criminalisation 
measures on institutions’ authority to compel individuals to comply with the law (institutional 
legitimacy).  
The study finds that certain indicators question institutional legitimacy and reveals the varied 
nature and extent of penalties imposed by different member states. The paper concludes that 
there is an important role for public trust in immigration law compliance, not just in measures 
directed towards irregular migrants but also towards those acting in solidarity with irregular 
migrants. 
 
This paper was prepared in the context of the FIDUCIA project, which is a research project that will shed 
light on a number of distinctively ‘new European’ criminal behaviours that have emerged in the last 
decade as a consequence of technological developments and the increased mobility of populations across 
Europe. For more information visit: www.fiduciaproject.eu 
 
CEPS Papers in Liberty and Security in Europe offer the views and critical reflections of CEPS’ researchers 
and external collaborators on key policy discussions surrounding the construction of the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. The series encompasses policy-oriented and interdisciplinary academic 
studies and commentary about the internal and external implications of Justice and Home Affairs policies 
inside Europe and elsewhere throughout the world. Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are 
attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any institution with which he is 
associated. This publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form for non-profit purposes only 
and on the condition that the source is fully acknowledged. 
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Executive Summary 
Subject Matter 
This paper comparatively analyses the legal regimes surrounding the criminalisation of irregular migrants 
and of those acting in solidarity with irregular migrants in the United Kingdom, France and Italy. The 
research was supplemented by an examination of laws in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. The paper 
examines European Union law and the interrelationship between European Union law and national 
provisions surrounding irregular migration.  
The focus of the research is on irregular migration, which is taken to mean irregular entry and irregular stay, 
and solidarity, which refers to assisting a person to irregularly enter or stay on the territory of a Member 
State and includes behaviour that may be described as humanitarian. Criminalisation includes detention, 
discourse and criminal law measures directed towards irregular migrants as well as identifying penalties 
which may be grounded in civil law. Criminalisation of migration means the adoption of criminal law 
characteristics in immigration enforcement and the adoption of immigration consequences for criminal law 
infractions.  
 
Method of Analysis 
The analysis consisted of two elements: firstly, desk-research was undertaken concentrating on the laws, 
policies and practices that both directly and indirectly criminalise irregular migrants at both the EU and 
Member State level. Secondly, a workshop was conducted with 21 local and regional government 
representatives, civil society experts and leading academics to discuss the issue of criminalisation of irregular 
migration. A follow-up questionnaire was sent to participants seeking information on specific research 
questions on the consequences of criminalising migrants and those acting in solidarity with them in their 
Member State. The results of the questionnaire were tabulated and progressively integrated into the paper.  
 
Key Findings 
The analysis of EU law and the comparative analysis of select Member State legislation reveals a significant 
ambiguity surrounding exceptions for humanitarian behaviour. The research also finds that, in general, 
penalties for those assisting irregular migrants are more severe at law than those contemplated for irregular 
migrants who breach laws surrounding irregular entry and stay (leaving to one side removal from the 
territory as a consequence for a breach of the law). The nature and extent of penalties differs between the 
select Member States. The research highlights the interrelationship between EU law and Member State 
criminalisation measures.  
The analysis of institutional legitimacy (the authority of institutions to command compliance with the law) 
revealed that there are several indicators which question institutional legitimacy of both the European Union 
and Member States in the migration context:  
 the use of criminal law in a selective manner to pursue immigration outcomes (chiefly, removal) when 
administrative law measures are seen not to provide a desirable outcome from a state’s perspective, as 
well as under-prosecution of migration offences, challenges the compatibility of such measures with 
the rule of law; 
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 the use of detention as an efficient means for managing repatriation of irregular migrants is challenged 
by data surrounding removal rates, multiple instances of detention, and a lack of strong correlation 
between extended periods of detention and repatriation rates; 
 the emergence of collateral consequences of criminalisation measures challenges the legality of 
measures when assessed against international, supranational and regional human rights obligations; 
and 
 the resistance against national policy by local and regional governments, by the public and by non-
government organisations directly assisting irregular migrants where national policy does not meet 
local needs and goals as well as a lack of moral alignment with the values asserted by the state. 
The paper reveals that additional research is required to address knowledge gaps in the assessment of 
institutional legitimacy.  
In considering how to reconcile criminal law and morality in the migration context, the research notes the 
challenges of doing so where administrative measures (such as detention) have qualities more akin to 
criminal measures and where discourse maintains a social stigma around certain behaviours.  
 
Conclusions 
The research concludes that public trust has an important role to play in immigration law compliance when 
directed towards irregular migrants through the use of fair and respectful treatment and processes as well as 
compliance with human rights obligations. Public trust also has an important role to play when directed 
towards those acting in solidarity with irregular migrants given the severity of the penalties contemplated in 
the select Member States’ legislation and evidence of resistance to national measures. The research also 
concludes that an understanding of the substance of consequences of criminalisation measures upon 
individuals, rather than only their legal form (as either criminal or administrative law), is essential in any 
attempt to reconcile criminal or administrative measures and morality. 
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1. Introduction 
In addition to the clear trend over the last 30 years of irregular migrants being the subject of criminalisation 
measures in an attempt to control irregular migration, there has also been a corresponding criminalisation of 
the behaviour of individuals who are in solidarity with migrants. The combined effect of these measures has 
been to place irregular migrants in an increasingly isolated legal and social space in order to coerce 
behaviour (chiefly, departure or removal from the EU territory). These measures are predicated on the belief 
that not only can irregular migration be controlled but that it can also be perfectly controlled – that is, that the 
law can be used in an instrumental fashion, removed from normative considerations that generally underpin 
criminal law provisions (that is, that the law embodies the ‘right thing’ to do). The realities, however, raise 
questions about the application of the law in this way. Further consequences touching the lives of irregular 
migrants have also emerged. But the impacts have not been limited to irregular migrants – the citizenry and 
regular migrants’ lives have also been affected through the criminalisation of acts of solidarity. Further, 
resistance to criminalisation measures has been manifested by citizens and from within governments.  
If compliance with the law is the ultimate goal, then there must be a high level of institutional legitimacy 
(that is, the authority of institutions to command compliance with the law). The concern about applying the 
law as it has been cast in relation to the criminalisation of irregular migrants and those in solidarity with 
them is that institutional legitimacy, an important factor in ensuring compliance, may be being undermined 
by diminished normative legitimacy (that is, the fulfilment of objective, quantifiable standards) and 
diminished empirical legitimacy (that is, the experience of those governed is that the authority asserted is 
legitimate). 
Accordingly, this paper examines whether criminalisation of irregular migrants and those that act in 
solidarity with them may be eroding institutional legitimacy at the European Union and national levels. After 
outlining the material and personal scope, the paper will encapsulate the theoretical framework which 
underpins the FIDUCIA project1 and the methodology adopted. The paper will then identify some of the 
intentional policy goals at the EU and national levels for the adoption of criminalisation measures, before 
proceeding to consider normative legitimacy by reference to the application of those measures and the 
emergence of other consequences upon the lives of irregular migrants as well as upon those of the citizenry 
and regular migrants. Lastly, the empirical legitimacy of criminalisation measures is explored by reference to 
the spaces of contestation and resistance before positing what may be the cumulative effect on public trust 
not only for irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them but for the European citizenry more 
generally.  
                                                   
 Dr Mark Provera is a Researcher in the Justice and Home Affairs Section of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
The author would like to thank Professor Elspeth Guild and Dr Sergio Carrera for their invaluable comments. The 
author also gratefully acknowledges the kind assistance of his predecessor, Joanna Parkin (whose research and 
assistance greatly contributed to this paper), Michele LeVoy and Maria Giovanna Manieri of PICUM; Susan 
Knickmeier of the Max Planck Institute, Germany; Luca Masera of Università Degli Studi di Brescia, Italy; Sylvia 
Koniecki and Mikel Araguás of Andalucia Acoge, Spain; Rian Ederveen of Stichting Los, the Netherlands; Anne-Marie 
Busser and Alessandra Ricci Ascoli of Amnesty International, the Netherlands; and all the participants of the workshop 
held on 17 March 2014 and the respondents to the questionnaire which formed part of this research.  
1 Hough, M, and Sato, M, Report on compliance with the law: how normative and instrumental compliance interact, 
(July 2013) FIDUCIA Deliverable 5.1. 
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2. Scope 
In order to achieve a holistic and nuanced understanding of the effect of criminalisation measures on public 
trust, it has proven necessary to examine simultaneously measures directed towards irregular migrants and 
those in solidarity with them. Such an approach recognises the intended coercive effect of law-makers to 
control irregular migrants from two angles. Criminalisation measures directed towards irregular migrants 
place them in a legally isolated space which attempts to diminish their agency2 and their ability to assert their 
rights. This effect is compounded by measures which criminalise the behaviour of those in solidarity with 
irregular migrants which both makes the assertion of rights more difficult and attempts to place irregular 
migrants in a socially isolated space (such as access to health care, accommodation, employment, food or 
education which may otherwise be supported by a legal right, diminished by criminalisation measures, but 
which may still be asserted with the assistance of, or interaction with, others/the citizenry). Indeed, research 
has shown the importance of social networks in the lives of irregular migrants.3 Accordingly, the cumulative 
effect of both legal and social isolation may well have the intention of coercing irregular migrants to leave 
the territory (that is, to make their stay on the territory so uncomfortable as to motivate their return to their 
country of origin or, at least, to outside the EU territory – a tool of immigration enforcement). Accordingly, 
criminalisation measures directed towards irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them have a 
complementary and symbiotic effect on the agency and assertion of rights of irregular migrants such that 
their joint examination is warranted. 
3. Definitions 
3.1 Criminalisation 
Criminalisation is a term that is well developed in the United States context which has seen some of the most 
repressive characteristics of the criminal law and immigration law (chiefly an administrative law domain) 
cross-pollinate (or, in Legomsky’s terms, be “asymmetrically incorporated”)4 and which has been both the 
subject of a number of academic writings,5 including the emergence of “over-criminalisation” of migration.6 
In the US context, “criminalisation” of immigration control has been primarily directed towards removal and 
encompasses a number of characteristics: the integration of criminal law “processes, categories and 
techniques” into immigration control; the integration of immigration law into the sphere of criminal law 
(such as the expulsion of migrants convicted of particular crimes);7 the prioritisation of resources towards 
deportation of migrants akin to a criminal enforcement approach; the adoption of criminal law enforcement 
strategies (such as preventative detention and plea bargaining); and the concurrent use of state and federal 
actors (such as enforcement officials and the judiciary).8 The distinction in the United States between 
criminal and administrative law spheres also has a corresponding effect on the Constitutional protections 
offered to the person the object of a measure.9 Accordingly, the development of the term in the United States 
                                                   
2 See further about the agency of individuals in a forced migration context, see Turton, D, Who is a Forced Migrant? In 
de Wet, C, (ed.) Development-induced Displacement, 2006, Berghahn Books, New York, pp. 13-36. 
3 PICUM, Book of Solidarity Project, 2002-2003, DG Employment and Social Affairs. 
4 Legomsky, S. H., The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms (2007) 64 
Washington & Lee Law Review 469. 
5 Legomsky, op. cit.; Stumpf, J, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime and Sovereign Power (2006) 56 
American University Law Review 367; Miller, T A, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control 
After September 11th (2005) 25 Boston College Third World Law Journal 81; Kanstroom, D, Criminalizing the 
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law” (2004) 29 North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 639; Miller, T A, Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms 
and the New Penology (2003) 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 611. 
6 Chacón, J M, Overcriminalizing Immigration (2012) 102(3) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 613. 
7 Legomsky, op. cit.; Miller (2003) (Op. cit.), pp. 617-618. 
8 Legomsky, op. cit. 
9 Stumpf, op. cit., pp. 390-391. 
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has centred around the degree of Constitutional legal protection (or not) to which a person is entitled based 
on whether the matter falls within the administrative or criminal law sphere. 
Although human rights guarantees (including procedural justice guarantees) both internationally and in 
Europe are not entirely free of a statist agenda,10 criminalisation in a European context embraces a much 
broader understanding which has included “repressive action of police forces, and then of judicial 
proceedings” because a person has “contravened to [sic] one or more norms of the administrative, civil or 
criminal code”,11 as well as discourse,12 the use of immigration detention13 and, importantly, is inclusive of 
the criminalisation of those persons acting in solidarity with irregular migrants.14 This broader 
conceptualisation is, for example, reflected in the research of the European Union’s Fundamental Rights 
Agency which has rather looked first at the existence of penalties for both migrants and those acting in 
solidarity with them and then identified whether those penalties emanate from the civil or criminal law 
spheres.15 The advantage of taking an approach that looks at penalties as opposed to their legal source 
recognises the cumulative effect that a concurrent civil and criminal measure can have on the assessment of 
its proportionality (that is, the deportation for a particular crime might involve the application of both civil 
and criminal law but its combined effect might constitute a disproportionate penalty on the person concerned 
or even double jeopardy). Further, such an approach also recognises that civil law measures may have 
purposes more akin to criminal sanctions but which may only be implied: such as deterrence and 
punishment. The approach is also sympathetic to the different geneses of criminal and administrative law 
amongst the Member States. However, the civil/criminal distinction remains relevant for at least three 
reasons: firstly, criminal law sanctions can have an impact on discourse and public perceptions concerning 
irregular migrants and the conflation of irregular migration and criminal activity;16 secondly, the 
civil/criminal distinction may be used by states to take a narrow construction of non-penalisation provisions 
in international agreements whereby civil law measures are used but which may have an equivalent, or 
worse, effect on their objects than criminal law sanctions;17 and thirdly, the standard of (evidential) proof 
differs between criminal and civil law sanctions.  
This paper takes as its starting point the scope set by an earlier deliverable of the FIDUCIA Project to 
encompass criminal law, discourse and detention18 yet further nuances this understanding by identifying the 
penalties that may be applied to migrants or those in solidarity with them. As procedural justice is at the 
heart of trust-based methods for compliance,19 this paper will at least focus on the criminal provisions and 
                                                   
10 Costello, C, Human Rights and the Elusive Universal Subject: Immigration Detention Under International Human 
Rights and EU Law (2012) 19(1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 257, pp. 261-263, 282 
11 Pallida, S, (ed.) Introduction, Racial Criminalization of Migrants in the 21st Century (2011), Farnham, Ashgate, 
pp.12-13 
12 Maneri, M, Media Discourse on Immigration: Control Practices and the Language We Live in Pallida, S, (ed.), 
Racial Criminalization of Migrants in the 21st Century (2011), Farnham, Ashgate. 
13 Rahola, F, The Detention Machine in Palidda, S, (ed.), Racial Criminalization of Migrants in the 21st Century (2011), 
Farnham, Ashgate 
14 Guild, E, Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Human Rights Implications, Council of Europe Issues Paper, 4 
February 2010, CommDH/IssuePaper(2010)1, Strasbourg 
15 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and of 
persons engaging with them (2014), Vienna  
16 Parkin, J, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: A State-of-the-Art of the Academic Literature and Research 
(2013), CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 61, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, October 
17 Schloenhardt, A, and Hickson, H, Non-Criminalization of Smuggled Migrants: Rights, Obligations, and Australian 
Practice under Article 5 of the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air (2013) 25(1) 
International Journal of Refugee Law 39; see generally concerning the use of criminal provisions in the European Union 
in the context of human trafficking and smuggling, Guild, E, and Minderhoud, P, (eds.) Immigration and Criminal Law 
in the European Union: The Legal Measures and Social Consequences of Criminal Law in Member States on 
Trafficking and Smuggling Human Beings (2006), Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff 
18 Parkin, op. cit. 
19 Hough and Sato, op. cit. 
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identify any procedural challenges to the migrant resulting from the classification of the measure as criminal 
or civil.  
3.2 Irregular Migration 
Consistent with the personal scope of the preceding deliverable under the FIDUCIA project,20 this paper will 
primarily focus on irregular migration.  
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of ways in which a person may irregularly migrate,21 for the purposes of 
this paper “irregular migration” will encompass two modes: irregular entry and irregular stay (consistent 
with the articulation contained in the Facilitation Directive).22 This distinction will also be sustained in an 
analysis of the criminalisation of those persons in solidarity with irregular migrants (that is, in the facilitation 
of an irregular migrant to enter and/or stay on EU territory). It is reflective of situations where migrants may 
enter territory with prior authorisation, but later become irregular (for example, those who overstay their 
visas) or who enter without prior authorisation but later become regular (for example, asylum seekers who 
are granted a right to remain pending the examination of their application for international protection) as well 
as those whose neither entry nor stay is in accordance with Member State law.  
In addition to acts which might constitute irregular migration, the paper also includes the status ascribed to 
individuals as an “irregular migrant”. As a starting point, the term “irregular migrant” is analogous to “third 
country nationals staying illegally” on the territory of an EU Member State as contemplated under the Return 
Directive23 and the Employer Sanctions Directive24 (Articles 3(1) and 2(a) and (b) respectively). This 
approach is consistent with the characterisation contained in the Facilitation Directive, which contemplates 
“a person who is not a national of a Member State” to enter, transit across or reside in the territory of a 
Member State “in breach of the laws of the State concerned” on the entry, transit or residence of aliens 
(Article 1). Accordingly, notwithstanding the emergence of EU law in relation to return and facilitation of 
entry and stay, the determination of whether a person is irregular remains dependent on national provisions 
but, as Guild notes, Member State provisions are not necessarily clear.25  
The definition contained in the Return Directive warrants further consideration on two fronts. Firstly, in an 
EU context, “illegal” is used in the sense that a person’s presence on a Member State’s territory is contrary to 
law, but a distinction must be made between behaviour which is “illegal” (denoting criminality with a 
normative underpinning) and “unlawful” (contrary to law consistent with an administrative breach) which, as 
Parkin notes, can have profound discursive effects.26 
Secondly, the definition under the Returns Directive contemplates irregularity in fairly binary terms. 
However, the term “irregular migration” represents, at times, overlapping spheres of migration behaviour 
which may include migrant smuggling, human trafficking, asylum seeking, and the seeking of temporary 
protection – that is, each form of migration may overlap at various points with a common ground of 
                                                   
20 Parkin, op. cit. 
21 Düvell, F, Paths into Irregularity: The Legal and Political Construction of Irregular Migration, (2011) 13 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 275; Anderson, B, Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (2013) 
Oxford, Oxford University Press 
22 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence (“the Facilitation Directive”) 
23 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards 
and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (“the Return Directive”) 
24 Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum 
standards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals (“the Employer 
Sanctions Directive”) 
25 Guild, E, Who Is An Irregular Migrant? in Bogusz, B, Cholewinski, R, Cygan, A, and Szyszczak, E, Irregular 
Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives (2004) Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 
pp.3-28; pp. 15-16 
26 Parkin, op. cit. 
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“irregularity” either at the time of entry or at a later time.27 Just as those categories of migration are not 
mutually exclusive (for example, those subjected to human smuggling might also seek asylum), those 
categories are also not binary in terms of the regularity or irregularity of entry or presence.  
3.3 Solidarity 
Solidarity includes the identification of two elements: the identity of the person or entity acting in solidarity 
with the irregular migrant; and the act of solidarity itself.  
For the purpose of this paper, the identity of the person or entity acting in solidarity includes individuals, 
both incorporated and unincorporated entities as well as government entities (such as regional and municipal 
governments). 
Acts of solidarity include behaviour which assists irregular migrants either to enter or remain in the EU 
(which the Facilitation Directive describes as “facilitation”). Such behaviour includes providing, or assisting 
migrants to access, basic rights such as health care, accommodation, education, transport as well as 
necessities such as food and clothing. It is behaviour which might be considered humanitarian – that is, the 
individual or entity might consider their act to be “good” yet is otherwise subject to sanction. The EU 
Facilitation Directive and the laws of some Member States do contemplate “humanitarian assistance” as an 
exception to sanction with “financial gain” or “gain” as a determinative element warranting sanction – all 
three terms may be open to interpretation. In light of the FIDUCIA project’s objectives of using trust-based 
methods for compliance which are conventionally directed towards the citizenry and regular migrant 
population, the criminalisation of acts of solidarity presents a very relevant object of research for the 
FIDUCIA project.  
For the purpose of this paper an examination of human trafficking is not included as this topic is being 
addressed under the work package of another FIDUCIA partner. 
It is acknowledged that greater clarity is needed concerning at what point acts of solidarity (such as 
humanitarian assistance or assisting irregular entry and stay) become acts of criminality (such as people 
smuggling and human trafficking). 
4. Methodology 
The research has been the subject of two elements: firstly, the formation of a clear research agenda involving 
desk research involving an analysis of the laws, policies and practices that both directly and indirectly 
criminalise irregular migrants at both the EU and national level.  
The second element involved a workshop with 21 local and regional government representatives, civil 
society experts and leading academics to discuss the issue of criminalisation of irregular migrants in their 
respective Member States and measures at the EU level. The outcome of this workshop clarified the research 
direction and a follow up questionnaire was prepared and sent to participants seeking information on specific 
research questions on the consequences of criminalising migrants and those in solidarity with them in their 
Member State. The questions focused on two parts: the criminalisation of migrants and the criminalisation of 
third parties. In relation to migrants, specific information was sought about the existence of crimes or 
penalties against migrants, the circumstances in which migrants would be apprehended or detained, the 
deterrent effect of apprehension and detention on irregular migrants, and the side-effects of a migrant 
criminalising regime. In relation to the criminalisation of third parties, specific information was sought 
regarding penalties on landlords and employers, the existence of duties to report, and any deterrence impact 
that these measures might have on third parties. The results were tabulated and, framed by a clear research 
agenda from the first stage, have greatly enhanced the understanding of the measures and consequences of 
criminalising irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them. These interviews and questionnaire 
                                                   
27 Triandafyllidou, A, and Maroukis, T, Migrant Smuggling – Irregular Migration from Asia and Africa to Europe 
(2012) Bassingstoke, Palgrave McMillan 
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responses will be progressively integrated to feed further this and subsequent FIDUCIA research 
deliverables.  
An in depth study of three Member States (the United Kingdom, France and Italy) was undertaken. These 
three countries were chosen in light of the fact that firstly, France and Italy had recently amended legislation 
removing custodial sentences for irregular stay and some insight was sought into the policy rationales behind 
those decisions; secondly, the United Kingdom was chosen to provide a partial counterpoint due to it being a 
common law jurisdiction as well as it not being bound by the Return Directive,28 the Employer Sanctions 
Directive29 and the Schengen Borders Code.30 However, the United Kingdom is still bound by the 
Facilitation Directive,31 the Framework Decision on unauthorised transit32 the Carrier Sanctions Directive,33 
the Reception Conditions Directive I34 and the Procedures Directive I.35 A more general examination of three 
additional Member States (the Netherlands, Germany and Spain) was undertaken to assist with the further 
substantiation of issues emerging from the analysis of the three primary Member States.  
The annexure to this paper contains a table of legislation comparing the six jurisdictions chosen. The 
information was initially sourced from research published by the FRA36 and was then cross-checked against 
the legislation of the respective Member States and the information provided by respondents in response to 
the questionnaire. The annexure aims to assist not only with a horizontal comparative analysis of the 
offences, their elements and their consequences across the selected Member States, but also provides a 
vertical analysis to compare the severity of consequences as between irregular migrants and those in 
solidarity with them.  
5. Institutional Legitimacy and Irregular Migration 
The theoretical framework of the FIDUCIA project as set out by Hough and Sato37 under an earlier 
FIDUCIA deliverable identifies two modes of compliance with the law – instrumental compliance (based on 
the notion of reward and punishment) and normative compliance (that the law embodies the “right thing”). 
The FIDUCIA project is concerned with normative compliance.  
                                                   
28 Recital 26 of the Return Directive  
29 Recital 38 of the Employer Sanctions Directive  
30 Regulation EC No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
31 Recital 7 of the Facilitation Directive 
32 Recital 7 of Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to 
prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (“the Framework Decision”) 
33 Recital 7 of Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (“the Carrier Sanctions Directive”) 
34 Recital 19 of Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the Reception of 
Asylum Seekers (“the Reception Conditions Directive I”) noting that the United Kingdom is not bound by its legislative 
successor – see Recital 33 of Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast) (“the Reception Conditions 
Directive II”) 
35 Recital 32 of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (“Procedures Directive I”) noting that the United Kingdom is not 
bound by its legislative successor – see Recital 58 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast) (“the 
Procedures Directive II”) 
36 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and of 
persons engaging with them (2014), Vienna 
37 Hough and Sato, op. cit. 
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In order to engender normative compliance, procedural justice plays an integral part – that is, through a 
process that is fair and respectful of those who engage with it, trust in justice is fostered and compliance with 
the law occurs.  
Fairness in the justice system (as but one subset of compliance theory) in turn feeds institutional legitimacy 
(that is, the authority of institutions to command compliance). Institutional legitimacy is assessed in terms of 
normative legitimacy (objectively against criteria) and empirical legitimacy (subjectively, the experience of 
those governed). The combination of both normative and empirical legitimacy is triangulated (that is, a full 
understanding of institutional legitimacy cannot be had without assessing both its normative and empirical 
legitimacy).  
The elements of normative legitimacy aim to assess the law against certain criteria using objective evidence 
such as efficiency, accountability, legality, ethical and moral standards and the rule of law.38 In the migration 
context, efficiency may be analogous to effectiveness. Czaika and de Haas note that there has been 
considerable academic debate as to the extent to which States have the capacity to control migration.39 
However, Czaika and de Haas have identified discursive, implementation and efficacy gaps in previous 
attempts to measure migration policy effectiveness and have developed a methodology for more accurately 
determining the influence of policy on migration flow by disaggregating terms such as “policy”, 
“effectiveness”, “effect” and more specifically identifying migration classes.40 Accordingly, for the purposes 
of this paper, the empirical evidence identified herein merely raises questions about the application of these 
measures and their effectiveness and which, in turn, raises questions about the impact of these measures on 
normative legitimacy. Coming to definitive conclusions could well be the subject of more detailed research.   
Elements of empirical legitimacy seek to understand the experience of the governed of whether the 
institution is legitimate; the legality of the measure concerned; and the moral alignment or shared moral 
values between the person and the institution.41 
In terms of assessing legality, normative legitimacy and ethical and moral standards, it is submitted that these 
are assessed by reference to fundamental rights norms contained in the EU Charter, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the European Social Charter as well as the principle of 
proportionality as a general principle of EU law (and which is legislatively embodied in, for example, the EU 
secondary legislation concerning detention such as the Return Directive and Reception Conditions Directive 
II).  
It will firstly be submitted that criminalisation measures directed towards irregular migrants and those in 
solidarity with them may be undermining normative legitimacy on account of being used in an instrumental 
and arbitrary manner and that the measures have had questionable compliance with legality and the rule of 
law. It will secondly be submitted that empirical legitimacy may be evidenced as being undermined by the 
spaces of contestation and resistance not only by the citizen public but also by local and regional 
governments which have expressly resisted and contested national measures to criminalise irregular migrants 
and those in solidarity with them.  
6. Identification of criminalisation measures and comparative analysis of select 
Member States 
6.1 European Union Measures 
As has already been explored under a previous deliverable, there is a relationship between EU law and policy 
in the field of migration and its effect on compelling its Member States to adopt “a restrictive stance in the 
                                                   
38 Ibid., pp. 6-8. 
39 Czaika, M, and de Haas, H, (2013a) The effectiveness of immigration policies (2013) 39(3) Population and 
Development Review 487; 487-488; de Haas, H, and Czaika, M, (2013b) Measuring Migration Policies: Some 
Conceptual and Methodological Reflections (2013) 1(2) Migration and Citizenship 40, pp. 40-41. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hough and Sato, op. cit., p. 8. 
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criminal law” which has, at times, been bi-directional and mutually reinforcing as between the EU and 
national levels.42 Indeed, it has been suggested that the challenges facing EU policy-making in this area have 
“incentivized” frontier Member States to adopt a restrictive approach.43 
In the EU context, there appears to be an underlying assumption that immigration can not only be controlled 
but that it can be perfectly controlled, chiefly through an instrumental use of the law. The realities suggest, 
however, that although EU policy may influence migratory movements, it cannot control them,44 rather 
merely displacing migrants to take other routes.45 Indeed, de Haas has demonstrated the existence of 
migration between North Africa and Europe is not new.46 Castles notes, amongst other things, that the failure 
of EU policy in relation migration is based on the assumption that it can be “turned on and off like a tap”47 
through the use of regulation when historical experience should inform otherwise and through the failure to 
address the much broader and complex dynamics that influence migration. Also bearing upon the ability of 
states to perfectly control migration are the consequences of human rights obligations to all those under their 
jurisdiction.48 Yet Carrera and Merlino note that the Stockholm Programme and the Commission’s Action 
Plan implementing it were devoid of references to the rights of irregular migrants (or irregular migrants as 
right holders) with the exception of unaccompanied minors.49  
Accordingly, if migration is not being controlled by not addressing the much broader and complex dynamics 
that influence it, then it raises questions as to the role of criminal law in immigration enforcement and 
against those who assist irregular migrants, particularly if it produces adverse consequences on both the 
irregular migrant and citizen or regular migrant populations – consequences which may be disproportionate 
to the objective sought to be achieved. One explanation may be that, as Sklansky has observed, the criminal 
law is being used instrumentally in an ad hoc manner – that is, there are indicia that criminal law is being 
used selectively (as opposed to systematically) based on practical considerations because of its effectiveness 
in securing immigration enforcement objectives when non-criminal law measures are not as advantageous to 
states (rather than its normative underpinning or because the action is inherently ‘wrong’).50 Sklansky’s 
position is a useful prism through which to understand the role of criminal law in the migration enforcement 
sphere as regards the interchangeability of laws based on pragmatism but it must be tempered against the 
particularities of the European context: firstly, Member States differ as regards prosecutorial discretion and 
criminal legal traditions; secondly, that the concept of criminalisation in Europe extends to those in solidarity 
with irregular migrants; and thirdly, that the two chief regional human rights instruments (the EU Charter 
and the ECHR) provide fundamental rights to all within a Member State’s jurisdiction with only very limited 
exceptions based on immigration status. 
What is clear is that Member States, although at liberty to introduce or maintain criminal sanctions on 
account of irregular entry or stay, have been constrained supranationally about the extent of those measures 
when they undermine the operation of EU law (notably, the Return Directive and its guarantees). However 
Spena makes the powerful point that EU law neither proscribes irregular entry per se nor prohibits Member 
States from adopting criminalisation measures, noting that the EU litmus test for the legitimacy of Member 
                                                   
42 Parkin, op. cit. 
43 Richey, M, The North African Revolutions: A Chance to Rethink European Externalization of the Handling of Non-
EU Migrant Inflows (2013) 9(4) Foreign Policy Analysis 409 
44 Richey, op. cit.; Guild, E, and Carrera, S, EU Borders and Their Controls: Preventing unwanted movement of people 
in Europe? CEPS Essay No. 6, November 2013, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
45 Spijkerboer, T, The Human Costs of Border Control (2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and Law 127 
46 de Haas, H, The myth of invasion – Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union, 
(2007), International Migration Institute, University of Oxford (www.imi.ox.ac.uk/pdfs/Irregular%20migration% 
20from%20West%20Africa%20-%20Hein%20de%20Haas.pdf). 
47 Castles, S, Why migration policies fail, (2010) 29(2) Ethnic and Racial Studies 205, p. 208. 
48 Hollifield, J F, The politics of international migration: how can we “bring the state back in” in Brettell, C B, and 
Hollifield, JF (eds), Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines, (2000) New York and London: Routledge 
49 Carrera, S, and Merlino, M (eds), Assessing EU Policy on Irregular Migration under the Stockholm Programme, 
October 2010, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe paper, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
50 Sklansky, D, Crime, Immigration and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, (2012) 15(2) New Criminal Law Review 157. 
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State criminal sanctions has been whether such national measures interfere with expedited return (the real 
object of the Return Directive).51 Accordingly, Spena notes the interrelationship between Member State and 
EU legitimacy.52  
In the case of those acting in solidarity with irregular migrants, where EU secondary legislation has 
contemplated criminal sanction by Member States, there appears to be a greater margin of appreciation given 
to Member States. Yet even in that instance Member State discretion is not completely unfettered – it must 
still be in line with fundamental human rights obligations to both those in solidarity with irregular migrants 
as well as to the irregular migrants themselves (as those in solidarity play an important role for irregular 
migrants to have access to and exercise their rights). However, as the EU has also introduced secondary 
legislation criminalising facilitation with a degree of ambiguity for humanitarian exceptions, its institutional 
legitimacy may also be subject to erosion.  
6.1.1 Relevant EU Legislation – Entry  
EU Legislation Concerning the Entry of Migrants  
Although there are no provisions for the adoption of criminal law sanctions against those individuals who 
enter the territory of the Union without prior authorisation, there are criminalisation consequences for 
migrants resulting from EU secondary legislation.  
The Schengen Borders Code (“SBC”)53 governs entry into the territory of a Member State. Sanctions are 
contemplated for persons who have crossed an external border of a Member State for unauthorised crossing 
at places other than at border crossing points or during the specified opening hours54 – sanctions are not 
contemplated for unauthorised crossing per se. However, the failure to fulfil the entry requirements of the 
SBC can result in the refusal at the border.55 Two consequences may flow from this: firstly, the individual 
may deemed an “illegally staying third country national” under the Return Directive,56 subjecting the person 
to an entry ban (in the circumstances where no voluntary departure period was granted or, if granted, the 
person has not departed within the voluntary departure period)57 – and possible detention pending removal;58 
secondly, the Member State may decide not to apply the Return Directive to the refused person59 and 
commence the return or removal process immediately which may include detaining the person. The holding 
of a valid visa (that is, prior authorisation) does not, of itself, guarantee entry into the Member State where 
the other requirements of the SBC have not been fulfilled (for example, the holding of sufficient resources).60 
This aspect was made visible (but with questionable legality) in the course of the Franco-Italian Affair which 
saw French authorities prevent the entry into France of third country nationals who had been issued 
residence permits in Italy on account of their lack of “sufficient resources”.61  
                                                   
51 Spena, A, Iniuria Migrandi: Criminalization of Immigrants and the Basic Principles of the Criminal Law (2014) 8 
Criminal Law and Philosophy 635, p. 639. 
52 Ibid 
53 Regulation EC No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) 
54 Article 4(3) of the Schengen Borders Code 
55 Article 5 provides for the conditions of entry of third-country nationals into the Schengen area, Article 13 provides 
under which circumstances a third country national may be refused entry into the Schengen area 
56 See Articles 6(1) and 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals (“the Return Directive”) 
57 Article 11 of the Return Directive 
58 Article 16 of the Return Directive 
59 Article 2(2)(a) of the Return Directive 
60 See Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code 
61 Carrera, S, Guild, E, Merlino, M, Parkin, J, A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and the Franco-Italian 
Affair, April 2011, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe paper, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
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In relation to asylum seekers, as discussed previously, there is an implicit preference for asylum seekers to 
arrive ‘regularly’ and then seek asylum62 under a system that insists on a territorial notion of asylum but 
provides limited means of providing authorised access to the territory.63 This is manifested by the differential 
treatment afforded to asylum seekers on account of where they make their application for international 
protection – that is, there is a distinction in treatment between border and other applicants. This distinction 
resulted in the possibility of Member States to severely derogate from guarantees rights to which border 
applicants might otherwise be entitled64 and which have since been removed under the second generation 
asylum legislation (noting, however, that the UK is still bound by the first generation asylum legislation as 
discussed earlier). However, the second generation asylum legislation still maintains a number of distinctions 
based on whether the person is a border applicant or not,65 indeed providing for the admissibility and 
substance of applications to be decided at border or transit zones.66 Despite the removal of some express 
distinctions between border and other applicants for asylum, the ground of detention introduced in the 
Reception Conditions Directive II affects border applicants as it contemplates the detention of an asylum 
seeker “in order to decide, in the context of a procedure, on the applicant’s right to enter the territory”.67 
Concern has been expressed that a narrow interpretation of that ground of detention provides implicit 
permission for Member States to detain asylum seekers at the border systematically throughout the period 
that their asylum application is being determined.68 The inference to draw from such distinctions are that 
border applicants are considered an immigration control failure and measures such as detention are a 
response to that perceived failure. 
The terminology contained in the secondary legislation maintains a criminalising discourse. In the Return 
Directive, the recitals refer to “the fight against illegal immigration”69 when the Directive itself provides no 
criminal sanction for the irregular entry or presence on EU territory. Indeed, as Guild notes, the adoption of 
such terminology may be used to more easily justify the use of coercive force on migrants to carry out the 
removal process – a process which is not a result of an outcome of the criminal justice system but which is 
carried out under administrative law.70 
In relation to detention under both the Return Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive, both pieces 
of secondary legislation contemplate detention in prisons which arguably has a reinforcing effect on the 
perceived criminality of third country nationals in a return situation as well as asylum seekers. Under the 
                                                   
62 Provera, M, The Detention of Asylum Seekers in the European Union and Australia: A Comparative Analysis, (2013), 
Oisterwijk, Wolf Legal Publishers, P.312 
63 Guild, E, and Moreno-Lax, V, Current Challenges regarding the International Refugee Law, with focus on EU 
Policies and EU Co-operation with UNHCR, September 2013, No. 59, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe 
64 See Articles 35 and 24(1)(b) of Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on 
procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (“the Procedures Directive I”); see also 
Article 14(8) of Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers (“the Reception Conditions Directive I”) 
65 See for, example, Articles 4(2)(b), 46(7) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (“the Procedures Directive 
II”); Articles 10(5) and 11(6) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (“the Reception Conditions Directive II)  
66 Article 43 of the Procedures Directive II 
67 Article 8(3)(c) of the Reception Conditions Directive II 
68 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Comments on the European Commission's Proposal for a 
recast of the Directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers (COM (2008)815 final of 3 
December 2008), 13 March 2009; UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Comments on the 
European Commission’s amended recast proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council laying 
down standards for the reception of asylum seekers, April 2011; ECRE, Comments from the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles on the European Commission Proposal to recast the Reception Conditions Directive, April 2009, 
Brussels; ECRE, Comments from the European Council on Refugees and Exiles on the Amended Commission Proposal 
to recast the Reception Conditions Directive (COM(2011) 320 final), September 2011, Brussels 
69 Recital 1 of the Return Directive 
70 Guild (2010), op. cit. 
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Return Directive, detention is to take place in “specialised detention facilities”.71 However, that provision is 
undermined by the qualification “as a rule” and with the express permission under the Directive for Member 
states to resort to prison accommodation where specialised detention facilities cannot be provided.72 
Although third country nationals are to be kept separate from ordinary prisoners, derogation is possible in 
“exceptional circumstances”.73 A similar formulation can be found in the Reception Conditions Directive 
II.74 The use of penal incarceration facilities for administrative detention is an example of criminalisation 
through the imposition of criminal consequences for immigration infractions and the use of the same actors 
governing, in this situation, the detention of both irregular migrants and convicted criminals.   
Although the Anti-Trafficking Directive provides for the non-penalisation of the acts committed by a person 
as a direct result of their being trafficked,75 the Directive is silent on whether this applies to breaches of 
immigration law – the Directive only contemplates exclusion from prosecution for criminal acts related to 
their being trafficked, not to breaches of administrative law (upon which migration law is predominantly 
based).  
EU Legislation Concerning Those in Solidarity with Irregular Migrants 
Unlike the EU secondary legislation directly affecting migrants, the secondary legislation in relation to those 
in solidarity with irregular migrants compels Member States to make provision for criminal sanctions for 
those that assist irregular migrants to enter the territory. The secondary legislation contemplating such 
penalties include: the Facilitation Directive;76 the Framework Decision on facilitating unauthorised transit,77 
entry and residence, and the Carrier Sanctions Directive.78  
The Facilitation Directive requires Member States to implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
sanctions against those who instigate, participate or attempt to assist a person who is not a national of a 
Member State to enter or transit across the territory of a Member State.79 An exception, based on 
humanitarian assistance to the person concerned, is contemplated80 but this provision is discretionary towards 
Member States rather than mandatory. Further, “humanitarian assistance” is not defined under the Directive. 
The Framework Decision supports the Facilitation Directive and compels Member States to provide for 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties against those transgressors of the Facilitation 
Directive.81 Extradition is expressly contemplated. In addition to the criminal penalties which Member States 
are compelled to provide, the Framework Decision also permits Member States: firstly, to confiscate the 
means of transport connected with the offence; secondly, to prohibit the person practising directly or 
indirectly the occupational activity through which the offence was committed; and, thirdly, deportation.82 
                                                   
71 Article 16(1) of the Return Directive 
72 Note, however, the CJEU’s decision in Cases C-473/13 and C-514/13 Adala Bero v Regierungspräsidium Kassel; 
Ettayebi Bouzalmate v Kreisverwaltung Kleve, Judgment, Grand Chamber, 17 July 2014 (discussed below) 
73 Article 18(1) of the Return Directive. Note, however, the CJEU’s decision in Case C474/13 Thi Ly Pham v Stadt 
Schweinfurt, Amt für Meldewesen und Statistik, Judgment, Grand Chamber, 17 July 2014 (discussed below) 
74 Article 10(1) of the Reception Conditions Directive II 
75 Article 8 of Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and 
combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/629/JHA (“The Anti-Trafficking Directive”) 
76 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence (“the Facilitation Directive”) 
77 Council Framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence (“the Framework Decision”) 
78 Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (“the Carrier Sanctions Directive”) 
79 Articles 1(1)(a), 2 and 3 of the Facilitation Directive 
80 Article 1(2) of the Facilitation Directive 
81 Article 1(1) of the Framework Decision  
82 Article 1(2) of the Framework Decision 
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Accordingly, the Framework decision provides an example of criminalisation through expressly permitting 
Member States to adopt immigration-related consequences for criminal activity. The Framework Decision 
also extends its reach beyond natural persons to include sanctions on legal persons (such as entities, 
organisations and corporations).83  
The Carrier Sanctions Directive compels Member States to provide for sanctions against carriers and to 
ensure the carrier’s responsibility (either directly or financially) for returning third country nationals who 
have been refused entry into a Member State.84 Accordingly, carriers (as private entities) have been co-opted 
into immigration control (a public function) with penalty consequences for transporting those passengers that 
are refused entry at the border. Accordingly, as was noted by a study conducted for the European Parliament, 
asylum seekers are greatly affected by the operation of the Directive because their need to flee and seek 
refuge cannot overcome documentary shortcomings (such as prior authorisation to enter – especially given 
the list of countries which are required to have visas to travel to Europe,85 even if transiting86) and the 
consequent risk that carriers face of penalty and responsibility for their return.87 
The terminology adopted in each of the Directives and the Framework decision refers to “illegal 
immigration”, further compounding the discursive effect between criminality and irregular immigration 
status.  
6.1.2 Relevant EU Legislation – Irregular Stay 
EU Legislation Concerning the Stay of Irregular Migrants 
The Return Directive applies to those persons who no longer fulfil the requirements of the SBC or the laws 
governing the stay or residence in the Member State concerned.88 The Return Directive does contain a few 
significant guarantees for those that fall under its scope – namely, the right to appeal a return decision,89 the 
maintenance of family unity, essential healthcare and treatment of illness, access to basic education for 
minors, and the taking into account of special needs of vulnerable persons90 for those under the voluntary 
departure period or whose removal has been postponed. Under the Procedures Directive, asylum seekers 
have a right to remain pending the determination of their application.91 Although the Return Directive 
provides that asylum seekers should not be regarded as staying illegally on the territory of a Member State 
until a negative decision on the application or a decision ending his or her right of stay as an asylum seeker 
has entered into force, that provision is only made in the recitals to the Directive, not the body.92 The choice 
of locating that provision in the recitals, with limited legal force, rather than the body of the text does nothing 
to compel Member States to refrain from associating the presence of asylum seekers during the 
                                                   
83 Article 2 of the Framework Decision 
84 Article 3 of the Carrier Sanctions Directive 
85 Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement 
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87 European Parliament, Analysis of the external dimension of the EU’s asylum and immigration policies – summary 
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89 Article 13 of the Return Directive  
90 Article 14 of the Return Directive 
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determination of his or her claim with an “illegal” presence. Indeed, it has been necessary for the Court of 
Justice to bring clarity to the status of asylum seekers detained under the Returns Directive.93  
EU Legislation Concerning Those in Solidarity with Irregularly Staying Migrants 
The Facilitation Directive,94 supported by the Framework Decision,95 both compels Member States to 
provide criminal sanctions for those who intentionally assist irregular migrants, for financial gain, to reside 
in the territory of a Member State contrary to that Member States laws on the residence of aliens. As 
“financial gain” is an element of the proscribed behaviour, humanitarian behaviour would normally be 
regarded as outside sanction but certain behaviours such as the renting of accommodation by landlords to 
irregular migrants are putatively caught by these provisions. Unlike for those assisting with the entry and 
transit of irregular migrants, there is no humanitarian exception relating to assistance for irregular residence. 
The Framework Decision contemplates criminal penalties in an identical manner to those who have assisted 
with entry or transit. The Framework Decision is also said to operate without prejudice to the non-
penalisation and non-refoulement provisions of the Geneva Convention and its Protocol.96 
The Employer Sanctions Directive prohibits the employment of “illegally staying third country nationals.”97 
The Directive requires Member States to co-opt employers into the immigration control regime by requiring 
that employers are presented with, and take copies of, the person’s residence permit and to advise relevant 
national authorities of the employment of a third country national.98 The Directive contemplates financial 
penalties on the transgressing employer99 with criminal penalties for continued or persistent breach or the 
simultaneous employment of a “significant number” of “illegally staying” third country nationals, as well as 
in circumstances such as exploitative work conditions or the employment of a minor.100 Other punishments 
can include the exclusion from public benefits or subsidies for a period of up to five years.101 Legal liability 
is not limited to natural persons but is also extended to legal persons as well.102 Employment is broadly 
defined and does not expressly contemplate remuneration, thereby potentially also covering voluntary 
work.103  
6.1.3 The Judicial Delineation of the Relationship between EU Law and Member State 
Measures  
Member States are subject to a framework of supranational accountability through the applicability of the EU 
Charter, general principles of EU law, secondary legislation and the decisions the Court of Justice (noting, 
however, the position of the United Kingdom which is not bound by the Return Directive, Employer 
Sanction Directive and the SBC). The Court of Justice has played a significant role in delineating the 
relationship between EU secondary legislation in relation to immigration control and Member States’ 
criminal law provisions in three areas: firstly, in relation to the application of criminal law sanctions in the 
context of the return of third country nationals under the Return Directive; secondly, in relation to limits on 
                                                   
93 Case C-357/09 PPU Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov) [2009] ECR I-11189, Judgment, 30 November 2009; 
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the use of detention; and thirdly, on the use of prison facilities in the context of those persons detained in a 
removal context. An emerging delineation in the realm of social rights may be evidenced in a recent Opinion 
of Advocate-General Bot.104 
Returns Directive: In relation to the delineation of Member State criminal law provisions and their 
interaction with the Return Directive, the Court held that the imposition of any penal sanction (that is, the 
Court expressly referred to criminal sanctions, not just “measures” which could undermine the effectiveness 
of the Directive) imposed for irregular stay must be in accordance with fundamental rights, and those of the 
ECHR in particular.105  
The Court has been clear and consistent in holding that, although criminal law sanctions may be applied to 
those in a return situation, they must not be such as to undermine the effectiveness of the operation of the 
Directive (that is, to hamper or delay the removal procedure) consistent with the principle of sincere 
cooperation.106 Although the matters adjudicated before the Court have concerned criminal law measures 
adopted by Member States, the Court has always maintained that that any measure (criminal or civil) which 
impedes or delays removal (and thus undermines the effectiveness of the Directive) will be incompatible 
with EU law. Indeed, the Court has not been concerned about the use of criminal sanctions per se (it has 
always acknowledged the competence of Member States in this regard) but rather the type of sanction, ruling 
that fines may be imposed (which do not impede the effectiveness of the Directive) rather than custodial 
sentences (which do impede the effectiveness of the Directive).107 However, the Court has also indicated that 
nothing in the Directive precludes the issuance of an expulsion order and entry ban in substitution for a fine 
where this can be enforced immediately.108 One wonders whether this may incentivise Member States to 
impose high fines for irregular entry or stay so as to compel irregular migrants to choose expulsion option on 
account of any impecuniousness. Such an outcome would lead to the guarantees under the Return Directive 
being undermined. 
A possible contributing factor to the adoption of criminal law sanctions in a return context stems from the 
Directive itself which permits Member States to exclude from the Directive’s personal scope those persons 
who “are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, 
according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures” (which will be explored later in 
the discussion on measures in select Member States).109 The Court has made clear that Member States cannot 
avoid the scope of the Directive merely by imposing a criminal sanction on the basis of immigration status 
only – to do so would undermine the Directive entirely.110 It would appear, then, that Member States are at 
liberty to apply the Directive in circumstances where an immigration consequence is being imposed in 
addition to a criminal sanction (that is, a sanction which is otherwise unrelated to immigration status). In this 
regard, the Directive implicitly permits the criminalisation of migration enforcement by contemplating 
Member States’ use of an immigration consequence resulting from a criminal law infraction unrelated to 
immigration status.  
Consistent with the Court’s view that the effectiveness of the Directive should not be undermined and that 
the return should be carried out as soon as possible, the Court has also indicated that the timing of any 
custodial sentence must not be before a return decision is adopted nor while the return decision is being 
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implemented.111 If the person has not been removed after the imposition of coercive measures under Article 8 
of the Return Directive, then measures (including criminal measures) may be imposed at that point.112 
Further, the Court was not persuaded that because a Member State rarely imposed penalties solely for the 
offence of illegal stay (that is, unconnected to another criminal offence) in practice that the effectiveness of 
the Directive was not undermined by the law.113  
Detention: The Court of Justice has also taken an approach towards the interpretation of the detention 
provisions of the Return Directive which has followed the terms of the Directive closely. This was seen in 
the interpretation of an absolute limit of 18 months’ detention under the Directive.114 Despite the suggestion 
under the Return Directive that other grounds for detention may be read into the secondary legislation as a 
basis for detention (Article 15(1)), the Court was clear in stating that no other grounds could be read into the 
legislation115 and that detention under the Return Directive was distinct from detention under the EU asylum 
secondary legislation.116 However, the Court was silent on whether that time limit included aggregated 
periods of detention. The judicial silence on this issue presents serious challenges for irregular migrants who 
are released from detention without any accompanying lawful immigration status and who may be placed 
repeatedly in detention for periods which aggregate to more than the 18 month limit permissible under the 
Return Directive.  
However, the Court’s decision in MG and NR,117 which held that any breach of the right to be heard on the 
decision to extend a detention decision is not invalid where the outcome of the administrative procedure 
would not have been any different, amounted to a complete rejection of Advocate General Wathelet’s 
Opinion.118 The decision sits uneasily with procedural justice theory, which emphasises a fair and respectful 
process to foster compliance with the law. 
Use of Prisons for Persons Detained in a Return Situation: The Court has also strictly interpreted the Return 
Directive’s contemplation for the use of prisons when specialised detention facilities were “unavailable” to 
Member States. In Bero the Court held that “unavailable” under the Return Directive was not to be 
interpreted as the unavailability of specialised detention facilities in one particular federated state but must be 
interpreted as the Member State as a whole, regardless of its constitutional or administrative structure.119 
Further, in Pham, the Court held that the wishes of a third country national to be detained in prison 
accommodation together with ordinary prisoners could not be taken into account and that the Member State 
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could not use the consent of the person detained to avoid its obligations under the Return Directive to detain 
third country nationals in a return situation separately from ordinary prisoners.120 
Social Rights: Although social rights of irregular migrants have not received a great deal of judicial attention 
by the Court of Justice, Advocate-General Bot indicated his view that, consistent with the general principal 
of equal treatment and non-discrimination contained in the relevant secondary legislation, irregular migrants 
are entitled to receive the guarantee of unpaid wages when their employer becomes insolvent.121  
6.2 Select Member States – Legislation and Policy Rationales  
General Observations 
As a general observation and from a juridical perspective, the penalties imposed on those assisting persons to 
irregularly enter and stay are more severe than for the actual person who has irregularly entered or stayed on 
the territory. One explanation may be that certain persons that assist irregular migrants (namely, citizens of 
the host country), cannot be subject to the additional measure of expulsion, in contrast to an irregular migrant 
who has irregularly entered or remains. This observation is qualified, however, on two counts: firstly, the 
severity of the contemplated penalties may also cover behaviour including people smuggling and human 
trafficking; secondly, further research is needed to examine the penalties actually imposed upon those 
successfully prosecuted for assisting irregular migrants. The legislative provisions of the select Member 
States are contained in the Annexure.  
6.2.1 Select Member State Legislation  
Member State Legislation Concerning Irregular Entry of Migrants 
Although the SBC does not contemplate penalisation for irregular entry per se, France, Italy and Germany 
penalise irregular entry. The Netherlands penalises where there has been a breach of the SBC. The United 
Kingdom (which is not bound by the SBC) also penalises irregular entry. In the case of France, the 
punishment is a term of imprisonment and a fine, whereas in the United Kingdom, there is discretion to 
apply a fine or a term of imprisonment or both. In Germany the punishment is either a fine or imprisonment. 
Spain, on the other hand, does not punish irregular entry. 
Of those Member States that do impose a prison sentence, the United Kingdom provides for both the most 
severe custodial sentence (not more than two years on indictment) and the most lenient (not more than six 
months on summary conviction) along with the Netherlands (also not exceeding six months). Both France 
and Germany contemplate prison sentences of one year. In terms of fines, Italy provides for the most severe 
fines with a maximum of EUR10,000 followed by the United Kingdom (GBP5,000 maximum), the 
Netherlands (EUR4,050) and France (EUR3,750, fixed).122 
Member State Legislation Concerning Irregular Stay of Migrants  
As indicated above, the Return Directive, although contemplating the return of “illegally staying third-
country nationals” does not actually contemplate criminal sanctions for those under its scope. The Court of 
Justice has not precluded the imposition of penalisation measures provided that they do not undermine the 
object of the Return Directive (that is, departure or removal). Both France and the Netherlands do not 
penalise irregular stay per se. In the case of France, the provisions on the punishment of irregular stay (both 
fines and imprisonment) were repealed by the law of 31 December 2012 in order to comply with the CJEU 
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decision in Archughbabian,123 whilst Italy has decriminalised irregular stay (and initial entry), reverting to an 
administrative penalty.124 In the Netherlands, the position is a little more complex. Although irregular stay is 
not punished per se, a person can become subject to a criminal conviction if they are declared an 
“undesirable alien” or are subject to an entry ban and have not complied with an order to leave the 
Netherlands. Accordingly only France does not punish irregular stay. Of those Member States that do punish 
irregular stay, a fine and a custodial sentence is possible in the United Kingdom (which is not bound by the 
Return Directive), whilst in Germany and the Netherlands, punishment is either a fine or a custodial 
sentence. Both Italy and Spain do not provide for custodial sentences, only fines. 
In terms of the severity, Germany provides for the longest custodial sentence at one year, with the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom contemplating sentences of six months (no more than six months in the 
case of the United Kingdom). The maximum fines contemplated range from GBP5000 (United Kingdom) to 
EUR 10,000 (Italy and Spain).125  
Member State Legislation Concerning the Facilitation of Irregular Entry  
The EU Facilitation Directive and Framework Decision contemplate criminal sanctions for those that assist 
persons to irregularly enter with an exemption for those offering humanitarian assistance but which Member 
States are not compelled to apply. All selected Member States punish assisting the irregular entry of persons. 
Only the United Kingdom and Germany contemplate the assistance with an element of financial gain, 
although an ambiguity exists in the German legislation which suggests that financial gain (or the promise 
thereof) may not be taken into account if the accused repeatedly assisted persons to enter irregularly or if the 
accused’s transgression benefited several foreigners. In the United Kingdom, the element of gain is present 
only in relation to those assisting asylum seekers. In France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, financial gain 
for assisting with irregular entry is not an element of the offence.  
Italy, the Netherlands and Germany provide no express exemptions for those assisting persons to irregularly 
enter. In the United Kingdom, the exemption is limited to those persons acting on behalf of an organisation 
to assist refugees and does not charge for its services which suggests that this section does not cover 
individuals acting in a personal capacity. Spain also provides an exemption for those transporting asylum 
seekers so long as they have presented their asylum request without delay and which is admissible for 
processing. In France, the recently introduced exemption decriminalising solidarity126 is, prima facie, much 
broader – it contemplates specific family members and those providing legal advice, food services, 
accommodation and medical care “or any other assistance to preserve the dignity or physical integrity of the 
person”.127  
All selected Member States except Spain (which only provides for a custodial sentence) contemplate both 
fines and custodial sentences. The United Kingdom provides the possibility of either a fine or custodial 
sentence or both (if a summary offence), whilst France and Italy provide for both a fine and a custodial 
sentence. In the Netherlands and Germany, it is either a fine or a custodial sentence. The Netherlands 
provides for the most severe fine at EUR81,000 followed by France (EUR30,000), Italy (EUR 15,000 
                                                   
123 Case C-329/11 Alexandre Achughbabian v Préfet du Val-de-Marne, Judgment, Grand Chamber, 6 December 2011; 
See the Exposé des Motifs: www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichLoiPubliee.do;jsessionid=1A086BE418596ED 
3F4A27A222F25AAE7.tpdjo15v_1?idDocument=JORFDOLE000026425454&type=expose&typeLoi=&legislature=14 
124 See PICUM, PICUM Bulletin – 27 January 2014, www.picum.org/de/nachrichten/bulletin/42771/#news_42777, 
citing, Il Sole 24 Ore, Dietrofront sull’immigrazione clandestine: non sarà più reato, torna illecito amministrativo, 21 
January 2014, www.ilsole24ore.com/art/servizio/2014-01-21/dietrofront-immigrazione-clandestina-non-e-piu-reato-
torna-illecito-amministrativo--123307.shtml?uuid=ABZ8y9q; La Stampa, L’immigrazione clandestine sarà reato 
soltano se recidiva, 21 January 2014 (www.lastampa.it/2014/01/21/italia/politica/limmigrazione-clandestina-sar-reato-
soltanto-se-recidiva-8Qxws0eLtMN5ZCS815qs5N/pagina.html).  
125 See the Annexure attached hereto. 
126 Loi No. 2012-1450 of 31 December 2012 amending L.622-4 of the CESEDA (www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich 
Texte.do;jsessionid=1A086BE418596ED3F4A27A222F25AAE7.tpdjo15v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000026871211&ca
tegorieLien=id). 
127 L.622-4 of the CESEDA. 
18  MARK PROVERA 
 
increasing to EUR25,000 in cases of particular gravity) and the United Kingdom (GBP 5000). The United 
Kingdom provides for the most severe custodial sentence (on indictment) of 14 years (but six months if dealt 
with summarily), whilst France and Germany both provide for five year sentences and Italy and Spain 
ranging from one to five years and four to eight years, respectively.128 
Member State Legislation Concerning the Assistance of Irregular Stay 
The EU Facilitation Directive and the Framework Decision both contemplate the criminalisation of assisting 
irregular stay but do not include a humanitarian exception even though “financial gain” is an element of the 
proscribed behaviour (which might normally act as a means of excluding humanitarian behaviour from the 
scope of criminal sanction). Assisting irregular stay is punishable in all selected Member States. In Italy, 
Spain, the Netherlands and Germany, financial gain or profit is an element of the offence (in the case of Italy 
it is construed as an “unfair profit” suggesting a somewhat higher threshold).  
Express exemptions apply in France and Spain (the same as with assisting irregular entry) as well as Italy 
(humanitarian assistance for foreigners in need) and Germany. However, in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, no express exemptions are contemplated.  
All selected Member States provide for fines (ranging from not more than GBP5000 in the case of the UK, to 
EUR10,000 to 100,000 in Spain). Spain is the only Member State that does not provide for a custodial 
sentence for assisting irregular stay. As with assisting irregular entry, the United Kingdom provides the most 
severe maximum custodial sentence (on indictment) of 14 years imprisonment (but no more than six months 
on a summary conviction). France and Germany contemplate custodial sentences of five years, with Italy and 
the Netherlands four years. France and Italy impose both a fine and a custodial sentence whereas the 
Netherlands and Germany provide either a fine or a custodial sentence. In the United Kingdom either a fine 
or a custodial sentence or both may be imposed.129  
Employment of Irregular Migrants 
The EU Employer Sanctions Directive prohibits the employment of “illegally staying third country 
nationals” with financial and criminal sanctions contemplated. All Member States outlaw the employment of 
irregular migrants resulting in either prison sentences or very severe fines ranging from EUR5000 per person 
employed (Italy) to EUR500,000 (Germany). Custodial sentences range from six months (summary offence 
if characterised as ‘facilitation’) in the United Kingdom (which is not bound by the Employer Sanctions 
Directive) whilst France and Spain contemplate custodial sentences of up to five years.130  
Duties to Report Irregular Migrants 
Public servants in Italy and Germany are under an obligation to report the presence of an irregular migrant. 
In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands information must be forwarded to the Minister or Secretary of 
State when the Minister or Secretary of State requests it. Questionnaire respondents noted that, in practice in 
the Netherlands, arrangements exist between municipal and national authorities that municipal information 
cannot be used to secure the arrest of irregular migrants. Germany and Italy contain legislative exemptions 
from duties to report exist for medical professionals, whereas this exception is more informal in the 
Netherlands based on information from PICUM.131 In the United Kingdom, changes to health care may affect 
the detection of irregular migrants through the proposed scheme to base entitlement to healthcare based on a 
charge linked to immigration permission or to persons described by the Secretary of State.132 Questionnaire 
respondents also indicated that the United Kingdom also requires schools and education providers to inform 
the authorities about those individuals under the points-based scheme who do not comply with study 
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requirements or are absent. In Spain, questionnaire respondents indicated that detection of irregular status 
comes to light through the information provided to the civil registry for those seeking to enter into marriage.  
Landlords 
On a broad construction of what constitutes ‘facilitation’, landlords may come under the scope of the 
Facilitation Directive and the Framework Decision. Recently introduced legislation in the United Kingdom 
has deprived irregular migrants from the right to rent accommodation, with both obligations on landlords to 
check the immigration status and fines of up to GBP3000 imposed on landlords for each offence. In Italy, it 
is illegal for landlords to rent property to irregular migrants in cases where the landlord extracts an “unfair 
profit” from the individual, suggesting a somewhat higher threshold. In such cases, this can lead to 
imprisonment for up to six months and the possible confiscation of the property. In the remaining selected 
Member States, landlords may be exposed to prosecution based on the facilitation of stay provisions in those 
Member States.133  
Other Measures  
In the United Kingdom, the Immigration Act 2014 introduces other measures which directly affect the ability 
of irregular migrants to access particular services in a not dissimilar way to the Netherlands’ approach (see 
below). Measures include the denial and revocation of driving licences to irregular migrants, health care 
charges based on immigration status, and duties placed on banks and building societies to check the 
immigration status of those wishing to open bank accounts together with the prohibition on opening bank 
accounts for irregular migrants.134 
6.2.2 Select Member States’ Policy Rationales  
As regards policy rationales, one can evidence that there are distinct tranches. Firstly, there is the perception 
that the use of criminal law in the use of enforcement is more efficient than administrative measures (Italy); 
and secondly, that the use of criminal law in combination with policies of exclusion and identification 
(Netherlands and UK) leading to a kind of ‘civil death’ for irregular migrants that might motivate them to 
return to their country of origin. 
Although the United Kingdom has included a criminal sanction for irregular entry and stay effective since 1 
January 1973, data gathered by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford show that the period 
of the late 1990s saw a substantial increase to the criminal statute books concerning immigration offences.135 
Aliverti notes that there are several interrelated rationales explaining the increase and reliance on the 
criminal law in the immigration sphere in the United Kingdom: firstly, as a means of overcoming a lack of 
confidence in the immigration system as a result of Home Office inabilities to reduce the number of 
outstanding asylum claims; secondly, due to wanting to back immigration enforcement with criminal law as 
a means of eradicating immigration “abuse”; and thirdly, to develop an immigration enforcement agenda 
through immigration crimes based on the level of “harm” they created.136 Although criminal sanctions have 
the traditional goal of “public protection” and “doing good”, these are aspects which Aliverti notes are absent 
from immigration enforcement when invariably the victim (the irregular migrant) is also the person whom 
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the State wishes to exclude and when the State is a source of harm by its use of legal barriers and its 
construction of illegality which in turn creates a demand for migrant exploitation.137  
During the second reading speech in the House of Commons on the recently commenced Immigration Act 
2014, which introduced obligations on landlords to check the immigration status of potential tenants, 
prohibiting landlords from renting accommodation to irregular migrants and punishing those landlords that 
do, the Secretary of State for the Home Department stated that “the Government also want to ensure that 
illegal immigrants cannot hide in private rented housing”.138 After referring to the provisions preventing 
irregular migrants from opening bank accounts, access health care, work, rental properties, and drivers’ 
licences, Mrs May stated, “We will do everything we can to make it harder for illegal migrants to establish a 
settled life in the UK when they have no right to be here”.139 
In Italy, the chief objects of its criminalisation provisions have been firstly, to improve the expulsion regime 
over an administrative-based system and secondly, to avoid the operation of the Return Directive. The Bossi-
Fini law in 2002 identified the “countering the danger of a real invasion to Europe” as the object of stricter 
immigration enforcement controls (including forced removal at the border) as a means of stopping the 
expulsion procedure from being undermined.140 This approach was further augmented by the two “Security 
Packages” in 2008 and 2009, whereby the 2008 Security Package made irregular immigration status an 
aggravating circumstance of a crime (but which was subsequently struck down by the Constitutional Court as 
being inconsistent with Articles 3 (principle of equality) and 25(2) (punishment based on conduct not on 
personal qualities) of the Italian constitution).141 The 2008 Security Package also introduced measures 
criminalising solidarity and attached immigration consequences (expulsion) where a person (including an EU 
citizen) has been sentenced to more than two years’ imprisonment for committing a crime.142 The 
criminalisation of irregular entry and stay was introduced in the 2009 Security Package. The significance of 
the introduction of criminal sanctions for irregular status was expressly to avoid the application of the Return 
Directive (and its associated guarantees, inter alia, of a voluntary period for departure)143 presumably 
through a narrow interpretation of Article (2)(2)(b) of the Directive which gives Member States the 
discretion not to apply the Return Directive in circumstances where the removal resulted from a crime (as 
discussed above).144 The 2009 Security Package also introduced the possibility for expulsion as a substitute 
sentence where the person had been convicted for the crime of irregular entry or stay. Di Martino et al are of 
the view that the real purpose of the substitution provisions (in combination with accelerated procedures) 
was to facilitate removal.145 Since the CJEU decision in Archughbabian,146 the Italian government recently 
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decriminalised irregular stay and initial entry, maintaining a range of substantial fines.147 However, it 
remains to be seen whether the practice of substituting expulsion for the payment of the fine continues and 
thereby continues to attempt to operate outside the application of the Return Directive.148  
In France, the crime of solidarity for assisting irregular migrants can be traced back to 1938, with further 
incomplete transpositions of the Schengen Agreement and the Facilitation Directive occurring in 1994 and 
2003 respectively (which did not include the “for profit” formulations contained therein or in the UN 
Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land Sea or Air). Indeed, the territorial application of the 
punishment provisions extended beyond French territory to acts committed on all Schengen territory and the 
territories of the state parties to the UN Protocol. Smaller immunities did appear in 1996.149 In 2005, the 
current formulation appeared as L622-1 in CESEDA.150 Allsopp notes that, under President Sarkozy, 
solidarity (in a particular, non-universal sense) was reframed as a product of immigration control and may be 
seen a means of conflict prevention to deter citizens from resisting removal procedures of migrants in the 
context of “immigration choisie” and quota-driven deportations.151 A country report for France produced 
under the CLANDESTINO Project noted that criticisms of “immigration choisie” centred around the more 
prohibitive aspects as regards irregular migrants, including the establishment of a specialised immigration 
police force and the use of quotas for expulsion and migration with concerns about the effectiveness of 
professional quotas.152 In 2012, the French government repealed the offence of irregular stay in order to 
comply with the CJEU’s decision in Archughbabian153 and broadened the humanitarian exception to 
facilitation of irregular entry or stay in light of the ECtHR judgment in Mallah.154  
In the Netherlands a dual strategy of both exclusion and identification has been adopted155 which manifested 
itself following the 1991 Zeevalking Commission and the adoption of the Linking Act in 1996 which linked 
databases containing information on immigration status to municipal records and the Benefit Entitlement 
(Residence Status) Act in 1998. Through excluding irregular migrants from education, employment, 
accommodation and welfare assistance, the idea is to place pressure on migrants to leave the Netherlands 
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and, combined with identification and documentation, to reduce their anonymity in the community.156 The 
Netherlands considers “the most important pathway out of irregularity is return” and for which the migrant is 
deemed to hold ultimate responsibility.157 Law and policy has been directed towards the issuance of return 
decisions for irregularly staying third country nationals (whom are given 0 or 28 days to voluntarily depart 
the Netherlands)- if given 0 days to depart the Netherlands, an entry ban is also issued. “Light entry bans” 
prohibit re-entry for up to 5 years whereas “heavy entry bans” (usually for those with criminal convictions, 
those who have lost their regular immigration status because of such crimes, or who are believed to present a 
threat to public order or national security) are issued for up to 20 years.158 Breach of the entry ban constitutes 
a crime. It is also possible to be declared an “undesirable alien”.159  
The Dutch Government sees detention as an essential tool in ensuring the effective return of irregular 
migrants.160 Research reveals that an additional reason for the use of immigration detention in the 
Netherlands is to pressure irregular migrants to depart the Netherlands and to induce cooperation with the 
mechanics of expulsion.161  
Amnesty International notes that the use of the criminal law to penalise irregular stay was contemplated in 
2002 but the then Minister of Justice, Piet Hein Donner, withdrew such plans in 2005 on the basis that it 
would not deter irregular migrants and over concerns that such measures would lead to pushing irregular 
migrants into crime to survive, with adverse consequences for society.162 The reagitation in the Netherlands 
by the current Rutte government for the criminalisation of irregular stay in 2011 was predicated three bases: 
on making irregular stay in the Netherlands unattractive; to deter irregular migrants; and to facilitate forced 
removal of irregular migrants.163 The Bill was withdrawn in April 2014 after the Minister for Security and 
Justice reached a political compromise with his PvDA colleagues (who had been uncomfortable about 
supporting such a measure)164 for the reduction of tax on middle income earners in return for dropping the 
proposed bill.165 
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7. The Use of Criminal Law, Prosecution and Detention  
As indicated earlier, institutional legitimacy is assessed by carrying out an assessment of both normative and 
empirical legitimacy. One element of the assessment of normative legitimacy is the efficiency of the law to 
do as it purports, to achieve its policy goals. In the migration context, ‘efficiency’ may be analogous to 
‘policy effectiveness’. However, there is great difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of immigration 
policies, particularly those which have criminalising elements. Czaika and de Haas point out that with 
multiple and competing stakeholders and motives (such as constituencies, non-government organisations and 
government agencies), “official” policy rationales may mask or be silent about implicit or collateral 
objectives.166 Accordingly, it is not immediately possible to identify the ‘real’ or totality of policy objectives. 
Further, without disaggregating both the purported consequences on, and classes of, migrants, it may be 
simplistic to ascribe certain outcomes to certain measures. Indeed, what constitutes “effective”? How to 
determine “policy effectiveness” or “policy failure” is highly variable depending on the perspective of the 
stakeholder – has a policy succeeded if it is mostly effective or if it simply has an effect? A fundamental 
question arises: from whose perspective is the policy a success or failure – the state, parts of the electorate, 
non-government organisations, private detention service providers or the migrant him or herself?  
In looking at the effectiveness of migration policies (that is, by testing outcomes against policy rationales), it 
is acknowledged that these are pressing questions that demand robust empirical research that could be used 
to assess the appropriateness of trust-based policy in the context of irregular migration. The aim is not to 
address these systematically here. For the purpose of this paper, several characteristics are identified which 
raise questions as to the application and effectiveness of migration policies containing criminalising elements 
and, accordingly, how these might inform institutional legitimacy. Of particular interest is the prosecution of 
migration crimes – both their application and the rates of prosecution. Despite penalisation provisions 
applying prima facie to all irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them, the choice and number of 
prosecutions, as well as any correlation between prosecution and enforcement, may be telling as to whether 
the criminal provisions undermine normative legitimacy by being applied selectively and minimally. In this 
way, some view can be formed as to whether the law is being used instrumentally as opposed to normatively 
and whether the application of the law reveals “ad hoc instrumentalism”.167  
In the United Kingdom, with an estimated population of irregular migrants of 618,000,168 the proportion of 
arrests which involved irregular migration status appear to be quite low. Operation Nexus (later Operation 
Terminus), whose object was foreign criminals in the United Kingdom, was a joint operation by the 
Metropolitan Police Service and the United Kingdom Border Authority (UKBA). In the first five weeks of 
the program, 25,968 persons were arrested, with 6,988 persons identified as foreign nationals (27%). Of 
those 6,988, only 155 were immediately detained for immigration matters and, of those 155 persons, 25% 
were removed from the UK.169 Accordingly, only 5.5% of foreign nationals arrested were deported on the 
basis of immigration matters, representing only 0.15% of all persons arrested in that five week period.   
Consistent with prosecutorial discretion of crimes in common law countries when in “the public interest to 
do so”,170 the United Kingdom’s stated policy in the prosecution of immigration crime is to reserve criminal 
law for the most serious offences,171 with removal being the most common enforcement action. Evidencing 
this approach and based on data gathered by the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, 30,763 
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persons were removed from the United Kingdom in 2011 either by force or by refusal at the border and 
subsequently removed.172 Removal is clearly the predominant objective when compared to prosecutions - 
553 persons were subject to proceedings in magistrates’ courts and 503 persons were subject to proceedings 
in Crown courts, with 559 persons convicted with immigration offences.173 However, the gathered data 
revealed that 47% of those convictions stem from facilitation offences (that is, not directly involving the 
prosecution of a person whose immigration status is irregular).174  
In relation to criminal prosecutions of employers of irregular migrants, the level of prosecutions and 
convictions (four prosecutions, three convictions in Crown Courts, four prosecutions and two convictions in 
Magistrates’ courts) is relatively low compared to the number of civil penalties imposed on employers (1111 
from January to September 2011).175  
Research conducted by Aliverti reveals that, in the United Kingdom, the use of criminal law in the 
immigration context is disconnected from punishment but rather is used as an enforcement tool when 
removal is not possible176 – that is, it is used when administrative measures are ineffective. Decisions to 
prosecute are based on the likelihood of removal, whether the person’s country of origin has a bilateral 
agreement with the United Kingdom, the availability of resources, the identity of the decision-maker and 
policy priorities at UKBA which Aliverti concludes “reveals the pragmatic and arbitrary use of criminal 
powers for immigration enforcement”.177 Prosecution of mostly petty immigration crime, with relatives and 
friends generally facilitating irregular migration (as opposed to organised criminal gangs) and reactive 
(rather proactive) policing is disjointed from a policy where prosecution is reserved for those causing the 
most serious harm.178  
In Italy, the use of criminal law as a more effective means of enforcing removal and attempting to avoid the 
scope of the Returns Directive was an express intention when the legislation was introduced (see discussion 
above). Unlike in common law countries, Article 112 of the Italian Constitution compels the prosecution of 
all crimes. Statistics assessed by Di Martino, et al, (2013) reveal that in 2009, 7157 crimes were tried under 
Article 10 bis of Legge 286/90, involving 7126 defendants.179 5323 criminal trials were commenced whilst 
1834 were dismissed (due to procedural or substantive reasons).180 Extraordinarily, only 26 convictions 
resulted. Through their research the authors could not find any rational basis for this discrepancy other than 
perhaps administrative removal had been effected during the course of the criminal trial or that criminal trials 
do not result in a conviction because the person has been removed.181 Spena also comes to the conclusion 
that criminalisation measures in Italy have been used to pursue pragmatic, non-penal aims and that there is a 
significant gap between the measures imposed and their normative basis.182  
In France, prosecution for crimes of solidarity has been well documented - prosecutions have been directed 
towards those who have directly assisted irregular migrants as well as a way of dealing with civil 
disobedience as regards the deportation and treatment of irregular migrants.183 The French model of 
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prosecution and enforcement is based on quotas. At the introduction of the 2008 amendments to the 
CESEDA, a quota of 28,000 expulsions was set with a corresponding quota of 5,500 prosecutions for 
‘aidants’ (those assisting irregular migrants).184  
In the Netherlands, a report by the Ministry of Security and Justice’s Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en 
Documentatiecentrum (“WODC”) has highlighted significant shortcomings in the application and 
prosecution of criminal sanctions in the form of (light and heavy) entry bans for irregularly staying third 
country nationals in the 2012-2013 period.185 The report reveals a relatively small number of light 
(approximately 8,000) and heavy (approximately 1000) entry bans were used compared to the number of 
return decisions issued (24,000).186 The report also reveals that once the 28 day voluntary departure period 
had expired, only 451 were arrested for non-compliance.187  
Of the approximately 8000 persons who had received a light entry ban, the authors noted that only 467 were 
apprehended.188 The resulting fine for breach of the entry ban in those 467 cases was imposed in 21 cases 
and only nine were noted in registrations of the Public Prosecutor Service.189 The authors could not establish 
whether the fines were actually paid, noting that even though police might refer light entry ban 
transgressions for prosecution, “the public prosecutor does not always recognise or register certain cases 
involving violations of the light entry ban” and gained the impression that fines are never or rarely imposed 
and do not result in imprisonment.190 
The authors identify several reasons why light entry ban violations are seldom punished: firstly, stakeholder 
consultation revealed that many thought that the use of criminal sanctions did not “offer[ ] any added value 
compared to instruments already available via administrative law, such as immigration detention”;191 
secondly, criminal sanctions for entry ban violations had little support from stakeholders because of the 
perception that it does not constitute a ‘real’ crime “and is considered less harmful than crimes such as theft 
and violence, and should therefore receive less priority”;192 thirdly, entry bans are used in stages by the civil 
servants imposing them and are subject to practical constraints (that is, in the context of airports, priority is 
given to expediting return rather than carrying out the full procedure involved with imposing an entry ban). 
Further, the authors draw the inference from the data that the issuance of a return decision is a stronger 
motivation for voluntary return when coupled with the threat but not the imposition of an entry ban – it was 
noted that once an entry ban has been issued, it has very little effect on motivating voluntary departure due to 
those subject to an entry ban being “unimpressed by the criminal sanctions that may follow”.193  
As regards heavy entry bans, the authors of the WODC report noted that there was a sheer lack of endeavour 
to detect those persons subject to such a ban – the usual path for a heavy entry ban being issued was through 
police interaction as a result of criminal behaviour – leading the authors to conclude that the “criminalisation 
of the heavy entry ban therefore seems a bit redundant, as prosecution is generally also possible on the basis 
of other crimes”.194 Punishment is usually by way of imprisonment with the imposition of fines being rare.  
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If the purpose of detention is to facilitate removal and/or coerce departure of irregular migrants, then such a 
purpose might be consistent with short periods of detention with high rates of removal and very limited (if 
any) instances of repeated detention. However, certain data raise questions as to the accuracy of that purpose 
and the legitimacy of detention. In Spain, the Ombudsman noted that, although detention is to be used to 
ensure effective repatriation, 52.49% of those detained in immigration detention centres in 2013 were 
removed – from which the Ombudsman drew the inference that 47.51% were not removed.195 In the United 
Kingdom, data compiled by the Oxford Migration Observatory noted that, at the two detention centres 
examined (Brook House and Campsfield House) in the 2008-2009 period, 57% of persons detained in the 
Brook House detention centre left the United Kingdom but that a substantial proportion (43%) remained 
(21% released, 16% transferred to another detention centre and 6% transferred to a prison or into police 
custody).196 For those at Campsfield House, an accurate figure of those given removal orders was unclear 
due to 42.7% apparently being given removal orders but 18% of such orders being unsuccessful – yet 21.2% 
were given temporary admission or bail and 35.7% transferred to other facilities.197 In the Netherlands, 
Amnesty International has noted that, in 2012, 50.5% of those were held for three months or longer and that 
29% of those detained in 2010 had been detained two or three times.198 In Italy, data analysed by Medici per 
I Diritti Umani noted that only 50.54% of persons in immigration detention were repatriated and that 
extending the detention period from six (in 2010) to eighteen months (in 2011) only resulted in a 2.3% 
increase in the repatriation rate.199 Accordingly, the legitimacy of Union law through the Return Directive 
may well be called into question given that the Directive provides for an 18 month maximum period of 
detention and is silent about aggregated periods of detention for those who have been detained multiple 
times. Further, as noted earlier, the Court of Justice remained silent about aggregated periods of detention 
under the Return Directive in Kadzoev.200 The International Detention Coalition has identified research 
which shows a lack of correlation between immigration detention policies and decisions by irregular 
migrants to enter a destination state.201  
Amongst the participants who were contacted as part of this research, almost all responses to questions of 
whether penalisation provisions imposed on irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them had any 
deterrent effect was that such provisions did not.  
Accordingly, we see that the selected Member States have used criminal law in an instrumental manner 
which appears disjointed from normative underpinning. The examples show the use of criminal law for 
practical reasons – to overcome administrative law obstacles to removal. The underprosecution of 
immigration offences reveals a high level of selectivity and arbitrariness which calls into question the 
measures’ compatibility with the rule of law. The inference to draw from these examples is that normative 
legitimacy may be being undermined because the objective data raises questions as to compliance with the 
rule of law, the predominance of pragmatic reasons for its application and the absence of normative 
underpinnings for the transgression contemplated. The United Kingdom, not bound by the Return Directive, 
provides an example of the internal choice of administrative or criminal law based on practical and arbitrary 
considerations. The Italian example shows the use of criminal law also for pragmatic reasons, but the choice 
is between national criminal law and the proper implementation of the Returns Directive in accordance with 
Union law. Conversely, the Netherlands’ example of entry ban underprosecution may partially be attributed 
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to the practical reasons that it hinders the overall objective of expediting return and that, in the case of heavy 
entry bans, detection is usually by secondary means (that is, in connection with another suspected and 
unrelated transgression rather than active investigation). Further, the significant rates of those not repatriated 
from immigration detention (Spain, United Kingdom, the Netherlands), rates of repeated detention (the 
Netherlands) and repatriation rates which do not appear to correspond with increased periods of detention 
(Italy) raise questions as to the legitimacy of national and Union measures surrounding detention.  
8. Other Consequences 
In applying measures which criminalise irregular migrants and those in solidarity with them, such measures 
may be having other consequences which may not have been sufficiently taken into account by policy 
makers. In response to direct questions to the group of questionnaire respondents about other consequences 
stemming from criminalisation measures, certain themes emerged: firstly, that such measures are leading the 
marginalisation of irregular migrants with a possible increase in their propensity to engage in crime; 
secondly, that marginalisation leads to both increased vulnerability to exploitation of irregular migrants and 
impunity for crimes; and thirdly, that there is an increased risk of racial profiling. Lastly, the impact of 
immigration detention on the mental health of detainees and the legality of measures taken by Member States 
will be examined.  
The distinction between measures which exclude or diminish the access of irregular migrants to fundamental 
rights and measures which criminalise irregular migrants is worth clarifying. Although rarely conceptualised 
by states as such, irregular migrants are right holders under international and regional human rights 
instruments along with each other person under a state’s jurisdiction.202 This is based on the principles of 
equality before the law and non-discrimination.203 The denial of fundamental rights of irregular migrants may 
occur de facto through particular measures adopted rather than expressly de jure. In combination with duties 
to report crimes, the role of measures which criminalise both irregular migrants and those in solidarity with 
them have a reinforcing effect on disabling irregular migrants from accessing their rights. This occurs: 
firstly, through criminalisation measures and obligations to report acting as a disincentive for irregular 
migrants to access their fundamental rights through state services for fear of detection, sanction and removal; 
secondly, as a result of such measures, irregular migrants then rely on social networks,204 such as citizens or 
regular migrants, to access their rights (for example, through the provision of health care beyond emergency 
healthcare and accommodation). By criminalising those who act in solidarity with them, irregular migrants 
are placed in a socially and legally isolated space where their rights are rendered inaccessible (at least as a 
question of fact) either in the irregular migrant’s individual capacity or with the assistance of others.  
Accordingly, questionnaire respondents were of the view that measures which criminalise both migrants and 
those acting in solidarity with them is leading to the marginalisation of irregular migrants in society,205 as 
well as confusion amongst service-providers and those wanting to assist irregular migrants about the extent 
(if any) of assistance they can legally provide to irregular migrants. Concerns over the increased 
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vulnerability and exploitation of irregular migrants resulting from criminalisation measures were a strong 
and common response of the workshop participants. As noted under an earlier deliverable, other EU-funded 
projects have revealed that migrants can be compelled to resort to “informal, shadow and niche activities” 
through the use of criminal legislation and over-policing.206 Indeed, as discussed above, one of the chief 
reasons for the Netherlands’ government not proceeding with the criminalisation of irregular stay simpliciter 
in the mid-2000s is that such measures would lead to marginalisation. In the United Kingdom, the targeting 
of landlords who provide accommodation to irregular migrants has, for example, led to concerns that such 
measures will lead to, inter alia, poor housing conditions and homelessness among particular migrant 
groups.207 Such measures which have the indirect effect of disabling right holders from accessing their rights 
calls into question the legality of such measures in light of international and regional human rights 
obligations – raising questions about the normative legitimacy of such measures and the institutions that give 
rise to and enforce them.  
Further, research of the FRA has highlighted that migrants’ real or perceived fears of detection can lead to 
impunity for the crimes of others due to a reluctance to engage with authorities.208 This may be exacerbated 
by obligations to report irregular migrants. Impunity for crimes impacts the totality of society as perpetrators 
are never brought to justice and both the victim and society suffer as a result – a substantial spill over effect. 
In this way, institutional legitimacy may be undermined where a victimless crime209 attributed on account of 
status210 indirectly leads to the impunity of crimes which involve both a victim and a substantive wrong.  
Questionnaire responses from the workshop participants indicated that racial profiling is affecting not just 
the irregular migrant population but the citizenry and regular migrant population. Chacón has identified the 
conflation of immigration enforcement to a criminal challenge as a factor which motivates and gives implicit 
approval for racial profiling in the United States.211 Racial profiling is an aspect which will be further 
developed in the forthcoming FIDUCIA deliverable on the criminalisation of Roma in Europe. As noted in 
FIDUCIA Deliverable 8.1,212 this concern is supported in research about the use of racial and ethnic profiling 
by police targeting of irregular migrants.213 The FRA’s EU-MIDIS report revealed quantifiable distinctions 
in treatment between those from minority backgrounds and the majority of the population.214 It has 
manifested itself in the targeting of foreigners as ‘easy targets’ to demonstrate improved police performance 
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Criminalization of Immigrants and the Basic Principles of the Criminal Law (2014) 8 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
635 
211 Chacón, op. cit. 
212 Vaccari, E, Allodi, M D, Maffei, S, and Guille, L, WP8 Criminalization of migration and ethnic minorities -  
Statistical review and summary, 30 May 2013, FIDUCIA Project, WP8.1, pp. 25-27. 
213 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Rights of migrants in an irregular situation in the 
European Union: Comparative Report, (2011), Vienna, P.40 
214 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU-MIDIS – European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey – Data in Focus Report – Police Stops and Minorities, (2010a), Vienna; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Towards More Effective Policing – Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic 
Profiling: A Guide, (2010b), Luxembourg 
THE CRIMINALISATION OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION  29 
 
as regards successful stops and arrests.215 The immigrant ‘spot checks’ used as part of the United Kingdom’s 
“Go Home” campaign raised concerns for the Equality and Human Rights Commission about unlawful 
discrimination.216 As noted in FIDUCIA Deliverable 8.1, the likelihood of being stopped by police on foot in 
Italy was ten times higher for foreigners than for Italian nationals.217 
The adverse impact on the mental health of individuals caused by immigration detention has been well 
documented218 as well as being a factor which can exacerbate pre-existing mental health conditions in 
persons, particularly those who have experienced torture or inhuman and degrading treatment.219 The 
circumstances of asylum seekers, detained during the determination of their claim, warrants particular 
consideration due to the impact that detention can have on their lives even after a positive determination of 
their claim. Research has revealed that detention has a long-term impact on the lives of refugees after 
release.220 Detention, in those circumstances, may well be having social and budget implications beyond the 
detention period as states then have to rectify the harm caused by immigration detention once a beneficiary 
of international protection is released from detention and is permitted to join the community. Further, given 
pre-existing vulnerabilities and the exacerbation of mental health issues that detention can cause, it may well 
be that those detained in a return situation are not in any position to consider the range of options before 
them and, accordingly, expecting that a measure such as detention will coerce voluntary repatriation may 
well be optimistic or even futile.221 Indeed, research conducted by the International Organisation for 
Migration (“IOM”) has shown that detention has no bearing on the willingness of immigration detainees to 
depart the host country (in that case, the Netherlands) and that other factors play a much more significant 
role.222  
In terms of the legality of measures and their impact on normative legitimacy, Member States have, at times, 
acted contrary to the law – that is, contrary to both established human rights norms and to European Union 
secondary legislation. The Court of Justice has been clear that any penal sanction imposed on account of 
irregular migration must be in accordance with fundamental rights, particularly those of the ECHR.223 It is 
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not intended to catalogue such transgressions here but merely to illustrate that the examples of 
criminalisation (as defined to include immigration detention) raise questions of normative legitimacy. 
Examples include where conditions of detention amounting to inhuman or degrading treatment,224 and a 
failure to consider the best interests of an unaccompanied minor and whether there were less intrusive means 
other than detention to effect deportation.225 At the CJEU level, reference has already been made to the 
incompatibility of criminal incarceration with the Returns Directive,226 the use of prison facilities to detain 
those subject to the Return Directive227 and the detention of a third country national subject to the Return 
Directive in a prison with regular prisoners.228 From a social rights perspective, the positive obligations of 
State Parties towards minors in light of their extreme vulnerability has been found lacking in an immigration 
detention context.229 Accordingly, the disjunction in the legality of actions taken by states in the context of 
detention raises questions about the institutional legitimacy of the originators of those measures.  
Accordingly, it can be seen that other consequences may flow from criminalisation measures directed 
towards irregular migrants. These examples raise questions concerning the normative legitimacy of 
criminalisation measures due to questionable compliance with human rights obligations (that is, with the 
legality of the measures). Criminalisation measures can have a compounding effect on measures of 
exclusion, resulting in further disabling irregular migrants from the exercise of their rights, contrary to 
international human rights law. Further, if marginalisation leads to impunity for crimes, both the victim and 
society as a whole suffer as a result. Similarly, racial and ethnic profiling resulting from criminalisation 
measures and attempted enforcement clearly contravenes non-discrimination norms which affect the 
citizenry as well as migrant populations. The adverse impact on the mental health of individuals caused by 
immigration detention raises questions as to compliance with international human rights obligations states 
have towards those whose vulnerability is further amplified by the control that states exercise over them and 
who are entirely dependent on the state for their needs. Lastly, the legality of measures taken by Member 
States in connection with immigration detention has already been subject to judicial disapprobation in 
individual cases and which raises questions about the legitimacy of institutions.  
9. Spaces of Contestation and Resistance  
Empirical legitimacy concerns the experience of the governed as to whether the institution is legitimate, the 
legality of the measure concerned, and the moral alignment or shared moral values between the person and 
the institution. Spaces of contestation and resistance give an insight into the empirical assessment of 
legitimacy. By contesting and resisting measures which criminalise both irregular migrants and those in 
solidarity with them, the inference to be drawn is that the governed (not only the citizenry but also the 
irregular migrant) experience a disjunction between the institution’s assertion of legitimacy and their 
experience of the institution’s exercise of authority – that is, a lack of moral alignment between values of the 
individual and the measures asserted by the state. Spaces of contestation and resistance may also evidence a 
lack of consent on the citizenry’s part to the assertion of authority by the institution. Further, spaces of 
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contestation and resistance exist not only horizontally between governing institutions and the governed, but 
also vertically within levels of government. Indeed, as was discussed earlier, the WODC report from the 
Netherlands’ Ministry of Security and Justice revealed that stakeholders had little support for criminal 
sanctions for entry ban violations because they were not considered a ‘real’ crime.230  
In this light, key examples highlight the disjunctions between the assertion of institutional legitimacy and the 
experience of it, as well as a lack of consent to be subjected to that authority. Firstly, the examination 
proceeds with regional level initiatives that sit in contradistinction to national policies in both the 
Netherlands and Spain; secondly, the emergence of public resistance to measures proposed or implemented 
by States against irregular migrants; thirdly, the role that civil society and professionals have taken to assist 
irregular migrants overcome the exclusionary obstacles put in place by national policy; and fourthly, the 
importance of fair and respectful processes for institutions to be seen as legitimate, as emphasised in the 
FIDUCIA theoretical framework.231  
9.1 Resistance at the Local and Regional Government Level  
The consequences of national policies criminalising irregular migrants is most directly felt at the local and 
regional government level. Local and regional governments are the authorities dealing directly with issues of 
policing, public order and public health. Local and regional authorities have a key role to play in the 
providing access to fundamental rights,232 as has been acknowledged by the Committee of the Regions233 and 
the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities.234  
Local and regional governments have developed (formal or informal) strategies for dealing with the direct 
consequences of national policy by, in some instances, having to navigate and/or counter government 
policies or measures.235 Such initiatives contest the idea that national policy is both necessary and uniform 
across all levels of government, contributing to a counter-discourse based on policy realities and a 
disjunction of national policy from local needs and goals.  
The disjunction between the Netherlands’ national policy and local government implementation has been 
noted in research conducted as part of the CLANDESTINO Project.236 Faced with some of the consequences 
of the Dutch national policies towards irregular migration (including public order and homelessness), the 
Utrecht municipality has developed strategies which attempt to deal with underlying issues leading to 
irregular migration and obstacles to return. Based on information provided from responses to the 
questionnaires and discussion at the practitioner and expert workshop, Utrecht municipality has contested 
Dutch national policy by firstly, providing accommodation for rejected asylum seekers contrary to Dutch 
national policy which releases rejected asylum seekers from accommodation centers in order to coerce their 
departure from the Netherlands. On the basis of public order and the prevention of crime, shelter is provided 
for rejected asylum seekers unless the national authorities can demonstrate to the mayor that the rejected 
asylum seeker has accommodation if expelled from the shelter – thereby placing the onus of proof on the 
government. If the mayor is unsatisfied that the rejected asylum seeker has alternative accommodation, then 
                                                   
230 Leerkes and Boersma (2014), op. cit., P.56 
231 Hough and Sato, op. cit. 
232 Gebhardt, D, Irregular migration and the role of local and regional authorities in Carrera, S, and Merlino, M (eds), 
Assessing EU Policy on Irregular Immigration under the Stockholm Programme, CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe 
Series, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, P.15 
233 Committee of the Regions, Draft Opinion, Strategy for the Effective Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights by the European Union, CdR 406/2010, 11/12 October 2011, para 14 
234 The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, The role of local and regional authorities in the implementation of 
human rights, 18th Session, CG(18)6, 1 March 2010 
235 See, for example, Signona, N, and Hughes, V, (2010) Being Children and Undocumented in the UK: A Background 
Paper, ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Working Paper No. 78, University of Oxford, P.35 
236 van der Leun, J and Ilies, M, Undocumented Migration – Counting the Uncountable. Data and Trends Across 
Europe. Country Report The Netherlands (2009) CLANDESTINO, FP6, European Commission, DG Research, pp. 12-
13. 
32  MARK PROVERA 
 
the mayor can prohibit police from executing the national decision to expel the person from the shelter. The 
municipality also provides emergency shelter for up to 100 rejected asylum seekers. Secondly, by providing a 
medical shelter for irregular migrants to administer medical and psychiatric treatment to migrants suffering 
from mental illness firstly, on the basis of human rights considerations and secondly, on the basis of the risk 
presented to themselves and those surrounding them – a move which initially created tension with national 
government policy. Thirdly, by distributing leaflets (in conjunction with the city of Amsterdam) entitled 
“Without Documents, Not Without Rights” setting out the rights of irregular migrants, including housing, 
medical, work, education and legal advice. This is in contradistinction to the Dutch national policy of 
exclusion and identification as a way of coercing departure. 
Although Spanish law requires that all inhabitants be registered regardless of immigration status, 
information was furnished from the questionnaire responses and workshop of Barcelona city council’s 
expressly inclusive approach that actively promotes registration of its inhabitants even in circumstances 
where the person concerned has no fixed abode which allows access to mainstream healthcare and municipal 
services (such as emergency shelter and language services) – thereby also reducing the need for costly 
specialised programs. Barcelona city council has also taken an innovative measure to tackle the challenges of 
intercultural diversity and to foster interaction with individuals though its Anti-Rumours Campaign237 - an 
ambitious project of targeting all citizens of Barcelona (including migrant groups) through face-to-face and 
multi-media interaction, building a network engaging 220 associations and institutions and training 900 
volunteer ‘anti-rumour’ agents from a range of educational and employment profiles, supported by a wide 
variety of data, manuals and resources. The campaign may be seen as a challenge to the legitimacy of 
institutions whose measures result in migrants (and, indeed, the population in general) experiencing the 
adverse consequences of national policy and discourse. The campaign highlights the impact of discursive 
(and counter-discursive) elements on social cohesion. It may be seen as a manifestation of a lack of consent 
to perpetuate discourse and to implement measures which criminalise and have an adverse bearing upon 
migrants, including irregular migrants 
These examples in the Netherlands and Spain may be seen as indicia of where the legitimacy of national 
laws have failed because they do not correspond with local needs and local goals, as well as sitting with the 
local experience of irregular migration. Further, they may evidence a disjunction of moral alignment between 
the citizenry and institutions. 
9.2 Public Resistance  
The mobilisation of city councils and regional parliaments was also an objective of the “Let’s Save 
Hospitality” (Salvemos la Hospitalidad) campaign in Spain initiated by the organisation Andalusia Acoge in 
combination with 12 other organisations.238 The campaign successfully saw, in November 2013, the 
withdrawal of a proposed Spanish law which sought to amend Article 318bis of the Codigo Penal by 
broadening the scope of the anti-trafficking and smuggling provisions to potentially include solidarity and 
humanitarian aid in broad terms at the discretion of the prosecutor. 
Public resistance was also evidenced against the use of mobile billboards circulating between 22 July and 22 
August 2013239 in six London boroughs with ethnically diverse settled populations as part of Operation 
Vaken – a United Kingdom government scheme designed to encourage voluntary return of irregular 
migrants as part of immigration enforcement action (which included immigration spot checks, raising 
concerns from the Equality and Human Rights Commission about ethnic profiling).240 The text of the 
billboards contained the text “GO HOME OR FACE ARREST”. The term “go home” in the United 
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Kingdom is said to carry particular racist connotations from the 1970s and 1980s.241 The mobile billboard 
campaign attracted 224 complaints to the Advertising Standards Authority,242 including criticism from a 
council leader243 and Redbridge London Borough Council,244 from within the Liberal Democrat coalition 
government,245 bishops,246 various non-government organisations such as Show Racism the Red Card247 and 
Liberty,248 and including a legal challenge on the basis of a breach of the Equality Act 2010.249 The 
Advertising Standards Authority subsequently found that the use of the words “GO HOME” in the campaign 
did not breach advertising standards, but banned the advertising for being misleading as to the number of 
arrests claimed to have been “made last week in your area”.250 The Home Secretary, Theresa May, indicated 
that the ‘Go Home vans’ would not be used again.251 The Home Office evaluation characterised Operation 
Vaken as successful, notwithstanding that 11 voluntary departures occurred as a result of the mobile 
billboards.252  
Allsopp has highlighted the tensions between universalist and particularist (that is, state-centric) notions of 
solidarity in the context of the debates on the delit de solidarité in France, identifying the support for 
persons who have been charged with the crime of solidarity, opposition to the introduction of the 2009 law 
(including a national protest in 2009) and resistance not only by organisations but also by concerned citizens 
and non-citizens which might be characterised as “civil disobedience”253. Allsopp gives some insight into the 
lack of moral alignment between national policy and individuals own values of ‘right and wrong’, citing the 
example of a French border policeman, Roland Gatti, who spoke out against the expulsion orders the police 
were to execute, noting that, on the night prior to the deportation being executed, he would give notice to 
families.254 Fekete also highlights examples not only of solidarity groups protesting against airlines who are 
used to transport forced removals, but also of the reaction of individual passengers against the treatment and 
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mishandling of forcibly removed persons on aircraft in the United Kingdom, Belgium and France.255 
Indeed, the coordination of multiple organisations and political parties opposing the introduction of the delit 
de solidarité in France in 2009 was also a characteristic of that campaign of opposition.256  
9.3 The Presence of Non-Government Services and Professionals  
In response to diminished means for irregular migrants to access social rights, a number of organisations 
have emerged to respond directly to those needs. Although it is not intended to provide a catalogue of 
organisations which assist irregular migrants, a select few will be highlighted as a way of evidencing a 
counter-strategy towards national policies which may exclude or be having adverse consequences on 
irregular migrants. What is important here is not the mere presence of NGOs but that, firstly, such 
organisations provide the very services that national governments ought to provide or, that these 
organisations provide parallel services to public services but with greater accessibility and reduced risk of 
detection; and secondly, that the work and mission of such NGOs is in defiance of national government 
policy. In some jurisdictions, such NGOs may be at risk of prosecution for assisting irregular migrants.  
Due to policies which severely limit access to medical services by irregular migrants, and due to concerns 
about detection, organisations have emerged composed of volunteer doctors and medical professionals 
providing almost parallel medical services to state-run schemes. NAGA provides medical and legal 
assistance to irregular migrants, Roma, Sinti, asylum seekers and victims of torture in Milan, Italy.257 NAGA 
expressly states that it does not operate as an alternative or competitor to public health services but exists as a 
response to a direct problem caused by state bodies.258 In Germany, Medibüro indicates that although 
medical staff are prohibited by law from reporting irregular migrants to authorities, access to standard 
medical assistance requires the involvement of the social security office which is under a reporting 
obligation, effectively resulting in the denial of health care due to fear of being identified and deported.259 
Accordingly, Medibüro, on the basis of strict confidentiality with the irregular migrant, responds to this need 
with a network of general practitioners and other medical professionals who provide their services free of 
charge. Medibüro states that its basis for action is opposition to social exclusion and the access of the right to 
health care independent of legal status.260 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the organisation Doctors of the 
World run a clinic in London for vulnerable migrants to overcome barriers to accessing health care.261  
In the United Kingdom, the issue of employer checks on employees’ migration status and their impact has 
been the focus of awareness campaigns that have seen the Migrants’ Rights Network collaborate with both 
the Unite the Union to develop a mapping report on those impacts,262 as well as the Trade Union Congress to 
develop a negotiator’s guide on how to manage employer checks.263  
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9.4 Fair and Respectful Processes  
Information was provided in the questionnaire about Stichting Haven International Partnership (SHIP),264 
based in Amsterdam but operating in the Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and Rotterdam areas of the 
Netherlands. SHIP is said to adopt an approach of respectful guidance of North African and Middle Eastern 
irregular migrants using native Arabic, Berber or French speakers to assist with voluntary return to the 
person’s country of origin.  
Research from the WODC in the Netherlands has highlighted that, in a detention context, the greater the 
detained person’s perception of detention as legitimate, the more willing a detained person was to cooperate 
with their departure from the Netherlands. The authors noted: 
“The more immigrants perceive the outcome of detention (repatriation) as legitimate, the more 
willing they are to cooperate with their return. Put differently: if an immigrant considers it just that 
he or she is detained in order to be returned, the immigrant will show a greater willingness to 
cooperate with departure. In the interviews, a majority of the immigrants said that they do not 
consider it just to be detained. They especially viewed the deprivations linked to detention (such as 
the lack of freedom and autonomy) as unjust. According to both staff members and immigrants, this 
perception tends to fuel the so-called ‘system fighting’, part of which is an active resistance to their 
deportation. 
It emerges from the quantitative research that how the return readiness develops depends particularly 
on the outcome justice of the detention, that is, the normative acceptance of the fact that the 
immigrant is required to leave the Netherlands.”265 
Research undertaken as part of the International Detention Coalition’s Community Assessment and 
Placement model has highlighted the importance of fair processes - noting that negative asylum decisions are 
more likely to be complied with by rejected asylum seekers if the refugee status determination process is 
fair.266 In the European context, fair process may be analogous to effective remedies under Article 47 of the 
EU Charter and Article 13 of the ECHR whilst incorporating respectful dealings and treatment of 
individuals.  
10. Conclusions 
The research and findings conducted as part of this paper are based on Deliverables 8.1 to 8.5 and which will 
form the basis of the Policy Proposals that are contemplated in Work Package 13 of the FIDUCIA Project.  
The theoretical framework of the FIDUCIA Project aims to assess institutional legitimacy through the dual 
lenses of normative and empirical legitimacy and also as a means of identifying ways in which compliance 
with the law can be engendered.  
Measures which criminalise migrants and those in solidarity with them present a particular challenge for an 
assessment of institutional legitimacy through normative compliance as the research has revealed a 
propensity for states to use criminal law instrumentally in the migration context. The instrumental approach 
adopted seems disconnected from a normative underpinning and is rather used for pragmatic reasons and in 
an arbitrary manner. Further, the instrumental use of the law in the migration context is contestable because 
it is based on the assumption that migration can be controlled – a premise which itself is vigorously 
contested in both academic and policy-making spheres.  
Normative legitimacy, which looks at the objective use of the law, is inclusive of quantifiable measures such 
as efficiency, legality and the rule of law. In a migration context, efficiency may be analogised to 
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266 Sampson, R, and Bowring, L, There are alternatives: A handbook for preventing unnecessary immigration detention, 
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effectiveness but which presents a number of methodological problems as regards assessment. In order to 
advance trust-based methods of compliance in the migration context, this is certainly an area that could 
greatly benefit from further empirical research.  
An assessment of the normative legitimacy revealed that institutional legitimacy may be undermined due to 
the legality of measures: firstly, through their application for pragmatic reasons, in a somewhat arbitrary 
manner and disconnected from normative underpinning which raises questions about compliance with the 
rule of law and secondly, the other consequences resulting from such measures raise questions about legal 
compliance – that is, compliance with international, supranational and regional human rights obligations.  
Empirical legitimacy, which seeks to examine the experience of those governed in a subjective sense, is 
inclusive of indicia such as the legality of the measure, moral alignment between governor and the governed 
and shared moral values between the individual and the institution. The research reveals that empirical 
legitimacy may be undermined where there is a disjunction between national and local or regional needs, 
goals, priorities and experiences such that empirical legitimacy within governments is contested. Resistance 
and contestation from local and regional governments, organisations and individuals are indicia that there is 
misalignment of the moral values between national policies and those governed. This may also be evidenced 
by the presence of organisations and individuals who provide support and services to irregular migrants (in 
sectors where the state would normally be expected to operate) in defiance of national policy. Fair and 
respectful processes are also shown to have role to play in fostering compliance with the law.  
Accordingly, on the basis of normative and empirical legitimacy assessments undertaken, it can be 
concluded that there is a basis for questioning the legitimacy of institutions which criminalise irregular 
migrants and those that act in solidarity with them. 
The FIDUCIA Project’s theoretical framework also explores the relationship between criminal law and 
morality, distinguishing crimes which are inherently wrong and carry some “normative charge” (mala in se) 
from regulatory or administrative penalties which do not carry any normative charge or stigma (mala 
prohibita).  
In striking this balance between law and morality, Hough and Sato suggest a synthesis of positions between 
the Hart-Devlin debate. Hart’s position was that criminal law should not be based solely on the moral views 
of the majority and that the criminal law should not intervene where no public harm was done or no rights 
were breached and that popular. Devlin’s position was that the legitimacy of the justice system required 
some level of connection between law and morality. Hough and Sato advance the synthesis of these two 
positions as follows: 
“1. Any extension of the criminal law needs to be justified primarily by reference to the need to 
preserve human rights; 
2. Any narrowing of the criminal law needs to be justified by reference to the fact that the laws in 
question do nothing to secure or protect human rights; 
3. Provided that these two conditions are met, it makes sense to maximise the degree of 
correspondence between the law and morality by ensuring that as far as possible behaviour 
proscribed by the criminal law carries a social stigma”267 
The challenge for viewing the criminalisation of irregular migration and those in solidarity with them 
through this theoretical lens results from the use of not only criminal law but also administrative law 
measures to criminalise migrants.  
Migration law is conventionally based on administrative law and has regulatory or administrative penalties at 
its disposal to ensure enforcement – such penalties can be characterised as mala prohibita and, as Hough and 
Sato point out, do not carry a “normative charge”.268 However, as indicated throughout this paper, the cross-
pollination of criminal consequences for immigration infractions and immigration consequences for criminal 
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infractions to ensure compliance (as put forward by Legomsky)269 has resulted in measures grounded in 
administrative law but which have assumed characteristics more akin to criminal sanction (such as detention 
or having the objects of punishment and deterrence). With the exception of trafficking in human beings 
(which is the subject of another FIDUCIA Project work package), irregular entry and stay may be considered 
victimless behaviour. As such, both administrative and criminal law sanctions may be equally devoid of a 
“normative charge” (which is a characteristic of conventional regulatory or administrative penalties whereas 
criminal penalties do carry such a normative charge and social stigma).  
Accordingly, the latter part of the theoretical framework may not reach its full potential in situations where 
measures are based in administrative law but with characteristics akin to criminal law sanctions (such as 
immigration detention). It is submitted that, as regards criminalisation of migration and those that act in 
solidarity with irregular migrants, the distinction between regulatory offences and criminal offences is 
irrelevant where the consequences on the individual are largely identical. In the migration context, an 
understanding of the substance of consequences of criminalisation measures upon individuals, rather than 
only their legal form (as either criminal or administrative law), is essential in any attempt to reconcile 
criminal or administrative measures and morality. Care should be taken to ensure that, in proposing a 
synthesis of the Hart-Devlin debate as advanced by the theoretical framework, states are not incentivised to 
transfer criminal law measures to the administrative sphere but with similarly deleterious consequences on 
human rights and with a discourse that maintains social stigma around the behaviour. Similarly, care should 
be exercised to ensure that states do not embark on a course of moral engineering to create social stigma, 
thereby engendering public trust and support for criminalisation measures against irregular migrants and 
those that act in solidarity with them that are otherwise inconsistent with universal human rights norms. 
The role of public trust in fostering compliance with migration law does present a paradox. This largely 
stems from the fact that the individuals whose trust a state wishes to engender (irregular migrants) are also 
the very individuals a state does not want in its jurisdiction. This is not to say that public trust has no 
relevance in the field of migration law compliance. On the contrary – the examples show that fair and 
respectful treatment and process have an important role to play in policy execution and compliance with 
human rights obligations. Further, it demonstrates that public trust also plays an important role for seeking 
the compliance of those who act in solidarity with irregular migrants – namely citizens and regular migrants - 
particularly given the severity of the measures against those facilitating irregular migration and the presence 
of resistance to criminalising measure.  
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Annex. Selected Member State Legislation  
This table contains the relevant provisions of the select Member States’ legislation dealing with the 
penalisation of: irregular entry and stay; facilitation of irregular entry and stay; employment of irregular 
migrants; renting accommodation to irregular migrants; and duties to report irregular migrants. This 
annexure forms the basis of the comparative analysis in section 6.1.2. 
Irregular Entry 
Behaviour UK France Italy NL Germany Spain 
Irregular Entry (1) Entry 
without leave; 











Yes, Article 10 
bis Legge 
286/90 
Yes, if breach 
of Schengen 
Borders Code: 









14(1) and  95 
para 1, no. 3 
Aufenthaltgesetz  
No 
Penalty       










EUR4050 Yes (amount 
unspecified) 
No 
Imprisonment (1) Not more 
than 6 months 
(2) Summary 
conviction – not 
more than 6 
months; 
Indictment – not 
more than 2 
years 
12 months No Not exceeding 6 
months 
One year No 






1971; section 37 
Criminal Justice 
Act 1982 
Both  N/A Either Either N/A 
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Irregular Stay 
Behaviour UK France Italy NL Germany Spain 













No  Yes, Article 10 
bis Legge 
286/90 
Yes, if person 
declared an 
“undesirable 
alien” or subject 
to an entry ban. 








Yes, Sections 95 








Penalty       






EUR8100 Yes  (amount 
unspecified) 
EUR501-10000 
Article 55 Ley 
Orgánica 
Extranjeria 
Imprisonment (1) & (2) Not 
more than 6 
months 
No No 6 months One year No 
Both fine and 
imprisonment? 
Possible. 




N/A N/A Either Either N/A 
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Solidarity 
Behaviour UK France Italy NL Germany Spain 
Assist Irregular 
Entry 
(1) Assisting illegal 
immigration  
(2) Facilitation of 
entry of asylum 
seekers into the 
United Kingdom 
Sections 25 and 25A 
Immigration Act 
197;1 Section 37 
Criminal Justice Act 
1982 
Yes, Article L622-
1 CESEDA  
Yes, Article 12 









Yes, Section 96 










Only in the case of 
asylum seekers 
(section 25A 
Immigration Act  
1971) 
No No No Yes, but may not 
be taken into 
account if done 
repeatedly or for 






Only in the case of 
those persons acting 
on behalf of an 
organisation to assist 
refugees and does 
not charge for its 
services – section 
25A(3) Immigration 
Act 1971 
Yes – family 
members 
(specified); those 
persons or entities 




and medical car e 
to ensure a 
dignified and 
decent conditions 
of life or any other 
assistance to 
preserve the 
dignity or physical 
integrity of  the 
person (Article 
L622-4 CESEDA)  




















Codigo Penal   
Penalty       
Fine (1) Summary offence 
– not more than 
GBP5000; if on 









EUR81,000 Yes (amount 
unspecified) 
None 
Imprisonment (1) Summary – not 
more than 6 months; 
indictable - not more 
than 14 years; (2) 
unspecified 
5 years From 1 to 5 
years; 
(increased by 
in cases of 
particular 
gravity Article 
12, para 3, 3 
bis, 3 ter) 
4 years 5 years.  4 to 8 years 
Both fine and 
imprisonment? 
Possible in case of 
(1).  
Both Both Either Either  N/A 
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Solidarity 














Yes, Article 12 
para 1 Legge 
286/90 
Yes, Articles 





Yes, Section 96 










No No If an “unfair 
profit” (own 
translation) is 




Yes Yes Yes 
Express 
exceptions? 
No Yes – family 
members 
(specified); 

















































delay and which 
is admissible 







Codigo Penal  
Penalty       
Fine Summary 
offence – not 
more than 




EUR30000 EUR15494 per 
person  




Imprisonment Summary – not 
more than 6 
months; 
indictable - not 
more than 14 
years 
5 years Up to 4 years 4 years 5 years None 
Both fine and 
imprisonment? 
Possible  Both Both Either Either  N/A 
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under section 25 
Immigration Act 
1971 




Yes, Article 22 




Article 22 para 






Yes, section 404 
(2) No. 3 SGB 
III (German 
Social Code) and 
sections 10 and 



















or restrict the 
rights they are 
recognised by 












Adults Subject to 
Immigration 
Control)(Maximu
m Penalty) Order 
2008); (2) 
GBP5000 fine or 
imprisonment not 
exceeding 12 
months or both 
(summary); fine 
or imprisonment 
not exceeding 2 




for 5 years, fine 
of EUR 15,000 
increasing to 
prison sentence 




fine is applied 





Law) + other 
sanctions 
(Article L 
8256-3 to 5 
Labour Law) 
Imprisonment 
for 6 months to 










for not more 
than one year or 
a fine of 
EUR81,000 




for up to three 
years of a fine 
 




for up to one 
year or a fine 
Imprisonment 
of 2 to 5 years; 
and a fine  









1971 and requests 
information from 
the public body 
for the purpose of 
ascertaining the 
whereabouts of 




Asylum Act 2002 



















Wet 2000 – 
administrative 
bodies are 
required to do 
so if requested 
by the Minister 
for the 
implementation 
of the Act  










































































of 6 months to 




EUR81000 or 4 
years’ 
imprisonment 











     
  







ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINALISING MIGRANTS 
 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is currently conducting a study within the framework of the EU-funded research project FIDUCIA (‘New European Crimes and Trust-Based Policy’). The study seeks to examine the implementation of policies and practices which criminalise undocumented migrants in Europe. It aims to identify the consequences of such policies, including their ‘policy effectiveness’ and to assess their impact on legitimacy and trust in justice institutions (police and the courts).  In order to help us gather the information necessary for this research, we are asking selected experts in EU member states to complete this short questionnaire, which comprises a total of 18 questions. We would be very grateful if you would respond to the questions, providing your observations and 
concrete examples where possible. Confidentiality of responses will be respected at all times– answers will not be quoted directly and responses will remain anonymous. We remain at your disposal should you require any further clarification concerning the scope and nature of the study. For more information on the project please visit: http://www.fiduciaproject.eu/     
 
Thank you very much for your contribution to this research 
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 Don’t know 
 
Please add further information if possible: 
 
Q.2. If yes, what are the penalties for irregular entry/stay? 
 
Please explain the standard penalties for punishing irregular status in your member state, if known: 
 







Please give any further observations and examples here:  
Q.4. According to your knowledge, how regularly are irregular migrants charged and prosecuted 





Please give any further observations and examples here: 
 
Section 1: Irregularity as a crime 
46  MARK PROVERA 
 
Q.5. According to your knowledge, what are the most common means by which law 
enforcement/border authorities identify and detain irregular migrants?  
(e.g. randomised identity checks in public spaces? Raids in places of employment, raids in places of 
residence?) 
Q.6. According to your knowledge, does the threat or arrest/detention have any “deterrence 
effect” on irregular migration. 
(e.g. does it affect the decision to enter and reside in a particular member state? Does the threat of 
arrest/detention affect decisions regarding return?) 
Q.7. What would you deem are some of the side-effects of criminalising irregular entry/stay? 
What are the most relevant unintended consequences of criminalisation? 
(for instance, as regards access to employment, social services, social marginalisation or public attitudes to 
migrants. Please supplement your observations with concrete examples where possible.) 
 
 
Employers’ sanctions  




I don’t know 
Can you provide any further information, for instance what kind of penalties (fines/prison sentences?) 
Q.9. According to your knowledge, are employer sanctions regularly enforced? How regular 





Please give any further observations and examples here: 
 
Section 2: Criminalisation of third parties 
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Penalties on landlords 
Q.10. Does your member state levy penalties on landlords/housing agents found to be 
renting/sheltering undocumented migrant workers? 
Yes 
No 
I don’t know 
Can you provide any further information/observations? Can you give concrete examples? 
Q.11. According to your knowledge, are penalties on landlords regularly enforced? How regular 





Please give any further observations and examples here: 
Q.12. Are any other third parties penalised for facilitating irregular migration in your member 
state?  
 
Please give any observations and examples here: 
Duties to report 
Q.13. Are duties to report the presence of irregular migrants imposed on third parties in your 
member states (e.g. medical professionals, schools, local authorities) 
 
Please give any observations and examples here: 
Q.14. If yes, are duties to report enforced and/or respected by those professionals targeted?  
 
Please provide your observations and examples here: 
Q.15. According to your knowledge, does the criminalisation of third parties/duties to report 
have any “deterrence effect” on irregular migration. 
(e.g. does it affect the decision to enter and reside in a particular member state? Does the threat of 
arrest/detention affect decisions regarding return?) 
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Q.16. What would you deem are some of the side-effects of criminalising third parties/imposing 
duties to report? What are the most relevant unintended consequences? 
(for instance, as regards access to employment, social services, social marginalisation or public attitudes to 
migrants. Please supplement your observations with concrete examples where possible.) 
 
  We are interested in the strategies employed by local and regional authorities and civil society organisations to counter/circumvent criminalising policies.  
Q.17. Can you provide any examples from your national context of measures by civil 
society/local and regional authorities to circumvent criminalising policies and 
practices? 
Please expand below (examples could include programmes by local authorities to offer services to irregular 
migrants on an unofficial basis, such as healthcare):  
 
Q.18. Can you provide any examples from your national context of measures by civil 
society/local and regional authorities to implement alternatives to criminalisation? 
Please expand below (e.g. could include campaigns by NGOs to change national legislation): 










If you have further comments on this questionnaire or the topics under study, please enter them below:  
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire! 
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